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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A MIRROR OF THE
FUTURE: CIVIC VALUES CONFRONTING MARKET
FORCE DYNAMICS IN A TIME OF
COUNTER-REVOLUTION
Zygmunt J.B. Plater*
1. INTRODUCTION: LEGISLATIVE ASSAULTS, A FUNDAMENTAL
PARADIGM, AND AN EGREGIOUS PUN
This essay explores the legislative assaults currently faced by en-
vironmental law, as the powerful market forces that gained at least
temporary congressional ascendancy in November 1994 attempt to
roll back legal doctrines and structures evolved in thirty years of
bipartisan development,! The "counter-revolutionary" tumult of the
104th Congress2 reflects a basic confrontation-between the powerful
*©ZJBP. Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Buck DeWolf, Bill Goldfarb, Jeff
Kopf, Lou Leonard, Bill Shutkin, Nate Stearns, Bruce Wickersham, and Annmarie WlXon
generously gave useful suggestions on parts of this piece, although they bear no blame for the
ample deficiencies that remain.
1This essay represents the continued development of an idea first presented in a symposium
on Environmental Law after 25 Years, ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamen-
tal Shift in Paradigms: A Theory and Short History ofEnvironmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 981 (1994) [hereinafter Plater, From the Beginning], and a symposium at the University
of Richmond commemorating the 20-year anniversary of the Allied ChemicallKepone disaster,
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution-The Kepone Incident and a
Review ofFirst Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (1995) [hereinafter Plater, First Principles].
2 It is probably inappropriate to label the current political climate a "backlash," which implies
a broad societal rejection of what has been accomplished. Despite justified criticisms of particu-
lar features of some programs, there appears to be continuing popular support for most envi-
ronmental values and programs. Rather it seems more like a counter-revolution, an opportun-
istic initiative by burdened interests to challenge and overturn first principles of environmental
accountability.
The 104th Congress is the focus of the current antienvironmental initiatives and this essay.
There have, of course, been other past and continuing political assaults on environmental
733
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human nature dynamics of market forces and society's need for en-
forceable civic values that transcend short-term profit expediencies.
Environmental law, reflecting a paradigm shift in how we perceive
the world, has emerged over the past three decades as one of the
primary realms in which society attempts to insert short and long-
term public civic values into practical economic affairs. This role in-
evitably makes environmental law a political battlefield. A survey of
some of the current battles, framed in that social context, allows some
useful long-term observations.
A. The Assaults
After the avalanche of the 1994 elections, the GOP's Contract with
America, an erstwhile election gimmick, became the legislative agenda
of a potent new congressional majority-to the apparent astonishment
of its own authors.3 Although the Contract did not mention the word
"environment,"4 it has become quite clear that environmental protec-
tion laws were among its major veiled targets. As the new majority
moved into power, long-simmering market forces launched a congres-
sional counter-revolution, seemingly dedicated to dismantling the le-
gal evolution of the past three decades and unlearning the scientific
and policy lessons so painfully gained over those years.
Facing only feeble opposition and an overwhelmed press that did
not know how to deal with the deluge, the 104th Congress's majorities
produced a remarkable "first hundred days," and a flood of bills,
law-through court actions, state legislation, the Sagebrush Rebellion, and the Wise Use
movement, in agenda-driven judicial appointment processes as in the Nixon and Meese-Sununu
eras, in judicial politics cutting back on plaintiffs' tort and citizen enforcement litigation, in the
standing and administrative intervention battles of the 1980s, and the like.
3 He Did It (Newt Gingrich Completes Contract 1uith America) (American Survey), ECONO-
MIST, Apr. 8, 1995, at A25. See generally Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regu-
latory Reform and (Breach oj) The Contract With America: Improving Environmental Policy
or Destroying Environmental Protection?, 6 RAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y, (forthcoming Winter
1996), at 1 (analyzing the vision of environmental regulation reflected in the reform proposals
of Contractarians).
4 The GOP's post-election book expanding upon the Contract with America mentions the
environment, but barely. See REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, THE CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA 126, 141 (1994) (declaring that "the Clean Air Act expressly forbids agencies from
weighing economic effects" and also claiming that mandatory cost-benefit procedures would not
"reverse all of the environmental progress made over the past two decades .... [They] would
provide greater accountability and guard against the creation of more politically motivated
regulations. Government exists to serve everyone, not the interests of the few.").
The sections of the Contract most relevant to environmental law are § 8, the "Job Creation
And Wage Enhancement Act" and § 9, the "Common Sense Legal Reform Act."
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riders, and low-profile technical amendments attempting to roll back
environmental law:
• suspending all substantive regulations retroactive to the election
and freezing all ongoing major rulemaking for a year;
• drastically cutting protective agencies' budgets and specifically
forbidding enforcement against various industrial lobbyists' clients;
• overriding all laws applicable to forestry conservation by mandat-
ing an increase in the subsidized clearcutting of public forests;
• repealing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments;
• cutting back on dozens of provisions in the Clean Water Act;
• reducing the Endangered Species Act to a symbolic minimum;
• decommissioning national parks or opening them to commercial
uses;
• drilling the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge;
• requiring rigorous and time-consuming cost-benefit procedures
when agencies protect resources, but not when they issue permits to
exploit them;
• forcing government to compensate industry for virtually all regu-
latory burdens on asset market value;
• shifting regulatory responsibilities toward state governments,
which are traditionally more vulnerable to market forces, and also
overriding state common law provisions burdensome to industry;
• and dozens more.5
A number of these bills passed one or both chambers of Congress; a
few of the bills became law.6 Industrial lobbyists played an unusually
overt role in drafting, propelling, and managing the bills through the
104th Congress.7
5 See infra section II.
5 The major provisions that passed into law were drastic appropriations cuts for EPA, the
Department of the Interior, and other environmental protection agencies. See, e.g., Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1995 (Rescissions Act),
Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194 (1995) (containing the "Timber Salvage" rider); Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the Department of Defense to Preserve and
Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, Tit. II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995)
(prohibiting the use of federal money for listing a species as threatened or endangered or for
listing clitical habitat); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 426(b),
109 Stat. 48 (to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (1995) (requiring that ifa member
makes a point of order that there is an unfunded mandate in a pending bill or amendment, 10
minutes of debate on each side is allowed, followed by a House vote on whether to consider the
measure).
7 The nature of the process was revealed by a wistful memo from an aide to Sen. Slade Gorton
(R-Wa.) when lobbyists delivered an anti-endangered species bill to him for introduction. The
memo noted "[t]he [timber and mining] coalitions delivered your ESA ... bill to me on Fliday
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As the 1996 elections approached, however, the lobbyists and an-
tienvironmental majorities at least temporarily began to downplay
the agenda, as they belatedly recognized popular antipathy to envi-
ronmental cuts.s The Contract on environmental law currently ap-
pears to be in remission. If reaffirmed in the 1996 elections, however,
it is poised to metastasize.
It is the thesis of this essay that the 1995 assault on environmental
law in the 104th Congress is instructive, not only for revealing the
majority's agenda as important national elections approach, but also
for illuminating the fundamental human nature behind the dynamic
market forces that dominate daily life, the societal role of environ-
mental law, and the long-term requirements of democracy and ra-
tional public environmental policy.
B. The Paradigm Shift and the Perceptions of Civic Value
Environmentalism over the past thirty years has shaped and reflected
a fundamental paradigm shift in how we perceive human society in
its geophysical context.9 In its development since 1960, environmental
law has embodied a new way of seeing cause-and-effect that can be
traced back to the work of Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson-recog-
nition of an ineluctable human tendency toward externalization of
social costs (Coase's teaching), and the cumulative, interconnected,
and disruptive consequences that can follow from such externalization
.... I !mow that you are anxious to get the bill introduced, however, it is important that we
have a better than adequate understanding of the bill prior to introduction." Christophel'
Hansen, Dispute on Gorton Memo: Critics Say it Slwws Business Lobby Wrote Species Bill,
SEA'lTLE PosT-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 7, 1995, at AI. Later that day the lobbyists sent the
Senator a section-by-section description of the bill so that he would !mow what he was advocat-
ing. Id.
S A GOP poller reported that "[o]ar party is out of sync with mainstream American opinion"
on environmental regulation. See John H. Cushman, Jr., GOP Backing Offfrom 'lb'llgh Stand
Over Environment, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1996, at AI. Advisories were sent out to members that
they should attend tree-plantings and similar events to distance themselves from chm'ges of
antienvironmentalism. As The New Republic has noted, the three major issues that have
chastened the latter months of the l04th Congress were popular disgust ,vith the House's
budget-hostage maneuvers, environmental protection cuts, and the crude dominance of special
interest lobbyists-all of which implicate environmental politics. Hanna Rosin, Whiplash, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 19, 1996, at 17.
9 Lately, there has been a tendency to label far too many things as "paradigm shifts." See, e.g.,
Brian Dumaine, Distilled Wisdom: Buddy, Can You Paradigm? FORTUNE, May 15, 1995, at
205. I too have been guilty of this proliferative tendency by purporting to find multiple basal
shifts in a single decade. See Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 1, at 998-1007. I recant.
Here I set out only one such concept, but the Coase-Carson analytical construct is significant
and fundamental enough to be called a paradigm shift.
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(Carson's teaching).l0 Environmental law evolved as a response to the
dark side of those dynamic market forces that have built the world's
largest economy and have made modern life so materially enriched
and diverse.ll Human nature as reflected in the marketplace, however,
inherently tends to ignore and pass on social costs to the environment
and to others.
For example, if I am producing a market good in a manufacturing
process that also creates harmful effects or wastes, the costs of neu-
tralizing the harms will be an unwelcome burden that I will try to
avoid by dumping the effects or wastes outside my sphere ofrespon-
sibility-into the creek, into the air, into consumers, into the land,
away. These externalized social costs, however, create serious long-
term, cumulative, interconnected consequences that demand serious
attention and are ignored at our peril. Recognizing the functional
importance ofthis perception, environmental law has used old law and"
new statutes to create a legal structure to monitor, restrict, and
account for the externalized social costs created by market forces.
Since 1960, beginning in the United States and continuing onto the
international plane, our society has experienced an extraordinary
development of scientific knowledge, law, and policy regarding the
physical and ecological world in which we live. Our quest for this
learning was driven by a recognition of systemic environmental prob-
lems and threats that were only incidentally perceived prior to 1960.
At its heart, environmental law has come to incorporate a set of
principles representing and accounting for civic values that extend far
beyond the realm of science and current events. Perhaps only in
environmental law has the modern legal system directly incorporated
issues of long-term societal survival into its operative norms and
doctrinal provisions.12
10 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (25th Anniversary ed. 1987) (1962); Ronald Coase, The
Problem ofSocial Cost, 3J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (showing how rational actors in the marketplace
seek to internalize benefits and externalize costs). Carson's Silent Spring was arguably the most
important single trigger of the environmental great awakening-the scientific treatise that
brought an ecological consciousness into the American mainstream.
11 Few environmentalists advocate a Luddite retreat to the pastoral, or government domina-
tion of the economy. Individual and corporate initiatives contributed immeasurably to the
mobilization and growth of technological sophistication in our society, and few believe that
economies centrally directed by government bureaucracies offer equal or better prospects. The
point is that society does not have to choose between the market and the government. Both
must playa healthy part to have a healthy society.
12 The "sustainability principle" is a prime example of the influence of environmental thinking
on our law, as are current legal norms for cleaning up contaminated lands beyond the limited
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By thus embodying civic values, environmental law transcends ecol-
ogy and raises issues of social governance.13 Scratch an environmental
law argument and you are likely to find an underlying question of
democracy-how individuals, corporations, and communities are to
balance their drives and needs, each day and over future years and
generations.
C. The Pun: The Four Horsemen ofthe Ecopalypse
And then there is a particularly bad pun that emphasizes the long-
term utilitarian importance of environmental law. Professor Arnold
Reitze has observed that there are three major human-caused prob-
lems threatening our long-term ability to sustain global quality of
human life in the natural setting we inherited from our ancestors:
Population, Wasteful Consumption ofResources, and Pollution.14 All
three reflect the serious implications from the human tendency to
externalize costs by ignoring the consequences of individual human
actions upon the commons.
But observing where we are today, there is a need to identify four
systemic problems, Four Horsemen of the Ecopalypse. The Fourth
Horseman of the Ecopalypse is a critically important governance
problem-The Gap between What We Know and What We DO.16 De-
dictates of current market values, for managing stratospheric ozone and the carbon dioxide
functions of global forests on behalf of planetary health, and for implementing utilitmian pro-
tections of the natural legacy of endangered species and ecosystems against unnecessm-y de-
struction, and the like. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE] (commonly referred to as
"Brundtland Report"). Sustainable Development was the theme featured in the 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio.
13 Not to mention mores. The vibrant field of environmental ethics-almost totally ignored by
our legislators in the political process-has recently produced a rich body of moral considera-
tions for environmental protection extending beyond strict utilitarianism. Coupled with my
assertion that only environmental law incorporates doctrinal considerations ofthe requirements
of a civic "hereafter," it is appropriate and heartening that this Article finds itself appeming in
this journal with two companion pieces oriented toward moral environmental responsibilities.
See Chuck D. Barlow, Why the Christian Right Must Protect the Environment: Theocentricity
in the Political Workplace, and David E. DeCosse, BezJond Law and Economics: Integrating
a Theological Ethics Perspective Into the Regulatory Takings Debate, immediately following
this Article.
14 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It Is Time for a New Beginning. 14 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L.ll1, 115-17 (1989). Reitze noted that the first of these is the most important and
daunting; the last is the least critical of the three. Guess where we spend most of OUr effort.
15 Although this is an egregious pun, without the fourth element there is no representation
of causative force, of the human fiaws-''hmnartia''-that drive the first three. By adding this
fourth human-caused dysfunction to the inventOl-y, the consequences of an underlying human
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spite a truly amazing expansion of ecological knowledge-about pol-
lution, population, resource losses, and the interconnectedness ofhuman
and natural systems, and the ability to communicate that knowledge
globally at the speed of light-it is distressing to observe the differ-
ence between knowledge and practice. Our capacity to implement
what we know about these serious threats consistently falls short, and
may even be falling further behind.16
Why, internationally and domestically, does the Fourth Horseman
find us falling short in implementing societal controls over environ-
mental problems? I would argue that the process of achieving what
we know should be done is held back by the same powerful market
dynamics that drive human enterprises and cause externalizations
in the first place. The same market forces that make civic regulation
necessary, constantly and assiduously attempt to resist and undercut
that regulation.17
The syllogism goes like this:
Reflecting human nature, the market forces that build the
economy instinctively attempt to externalize costs ...
which necessitates some form of externally-imposed regulation
incorporating public values ...
which in turn these market forces continuously, comprehensively,
and powerfully resist ....
And in the 104th Congress, those market forces, clothed in the garb
of populism, have tried to roll back and overturn the civic regulations
that constrain private entrepreneurial interests.
It is no surprise that the Marketplace resists the imposition of
public values upon private enterprises. For years in Corporate Law,
we have taught that the duty of corporations-which playa dominant
dilemma are denoted as a global problem, and the phrase coincidentally becomes somewhat more
memorable.
16 From global warming and expansion of populations beyond carrying capacity, to overgraz-
ing, the crash of fisheries, and pollution in urban neighborhoods, we usually lmow what causes
the problems and how to stop them, but effectively addressing this need seems to be humauly
impossible. See infra section IV.
17 The phenomenon of interlocking negative consequences is not just an American concern.
The experience of other countries and, at the level of international governance, the fractional-
izing tendencies of 175 separate sovereignties, echo the dysfunctional externalization paradigm.
With only a few exceptions, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layel~ which is probably the most significant example of an international environmental con-
vention that works, treaties with enforceable constraints on externalizations do not get ratified,
and treaties that do get ratified tend to have ample loopholes or no teeth. MONTREAL PROTOCOL
ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987).
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role in every free society, and in none more so than ours-is to
maximize the interest of their shareholders, not to advance any altru-
istic broader public good. "Get Government out of the way of the
Marketplace" would theoretically be an acceptable societal principle
if the Market could and would accomplish the necessary public duties
for which government is designed. But it cannot or will not. Estab-
lishments do not self-correct when faced with the discovery that their
self interest conflicts with external civic values. The doing of public
good (beyond some positive spillover effects of corporate self interest)
is systemically consigned to voluntary organizations like churches and
scout troops-a thousand points of light confronting a million points
of profit?-and, more tangibly, to government.
But market forces are arguably the most dominant and powerful
structures in modern society, a position that sets up a serious problem.
When governments attempt to impose "artificial" non-market public
values upon an industry (or upon private individuals), there is an
understandable and inherent instinct to attempt to avoid or resist such
imposition and the attendant costs. Multiply the tendency of each eco-
nomic entity to resist cost internalization by tens of thousands of corpo-
rations, and the result is a vast concurrent resistance that permeates
and erodes the effort to instill civic values in the governance process.
How do marketplace actors react to regulations and guidelines
applying public values that undercut private gain? They react in quite
understandable human terms:
• seeking to comply, especially (though not exclusively) when regu-
lations are mandatory and credible enforcement is likely;
• seeking to avoid compliance, on the facts by denying the existence
or validity of the problem and trying to avoid proof of violations, or
on the .law by contesting the authority of agencies, courts, or private
citizen plaintiffs, and aggressively litigating every step of the way;18
• trying to undercut regulatory effectiveness by advocating cuts in
appropriations, particularly appropriations for enforcement;
• trying to modify or repeal the restrictive requirements ofstatutes
and regulations, arguing that "the pendulum has swung too far."19
18 Confrontation is often coupled with seduction: agency staffers are lured into the camps of
the industries they regulate through the "capture" phenomenon well known to Political Science.
See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 557-61 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER ET AL., NLS].
19 The author started hearing this pendulum-too-far phrase as early as 1971 in conversations
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These strategies can run concurrently. In the first decade of envi-
ronmentallaw, when enforcement structures were new and uncertain,
resistance to enforcement was probably a prevalent mode, along with
simultaneous limited gestures toward compliance.2o Subsequently, as
environmental law enforcement has become surer and better known,
many corporate enterprises have institutionalized compliance efforts
through vigorous inspection, self audits, and organizational redesign.
'We have seen the light," say some executives. "Now trust us, and go
after someone else."21 The fact that industries generally move toward
compliance, however, does not mean that they also abandon their
attempts at avoidance strategies.
The Contract Congress reflects a shift of the regulated market's
focus toward the latter two strategies-cutting appropriations and
overturning the laws on the books. The runaway first session of the
104th Congress has demonstrated a moment of market force domi-
nance of governmental processes, its perils, and its antidotes. Ifmar-
ket forces effectively dominate the regulatory mechanisms ofgovern-
ment-which were created in the first place to correct the Market's
failure to integrate necessary public civic values-then where and by
whom will these public civic values be brought into the process of
social governance?
The antidote, as current events seem to indicate, is a process that
ensures the consideration ofpublic merits-within environmental law,
and within legislative initiatives that attempt to override environ-
mental law. This process requires informed and engaged profession-
als, an incisive press, and an active citizenry. Environmentalism, in
other words, often ends up being another word for democracy.
with paper industry officials. That was before any significant federal regulation of toxies had
passed, before the Clean Water Act's (CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) had gone into effect, before most modern water quality standards had been defined.
20 The Allied Chemical Corporation's reaction in the early days of federal water pollution
enforcement was classic. Faced with the new federal program and extensive dumping from its
Hopewell Vrrginia plant, the company made plans to shift the effluents to the public sewer
system, meanwhile providing the federal government with limited (and inaccurate) compliance
information. See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 42-49, 336-46.
21 See Anne L. Kelly, The Limits of Corporate SelfRegulation: Keeping the Environmental
Heat on T/wse W/W Haven't Seen the Light (forthcoming, in author's files). While recognizing
and applauding widespread market internalization of environmental compliance, environmental
advocates do not advise abandonment of vigorous enforcement programs. Just as effective drug
interdiction or securities fraud programs cannot shut down once their targets acknowledge their
enforcement credibility, agencies and citizens have to maintain credible monitoring and enforce-
ment activity.
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II. THE 104TH CONGRESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
House Republicans are united in the belief that the people's House must
be wrested from the grip of special interests and handed back to you,
the American people.
-Rep. Richard Armey (R-Tex.)
(on the Capitol steps announcing the Contract with America)22
Early in 1994 more than 300 industry groups gathered together to
create "Project Relief," a lobbying movement to roll back governmen-
tal regulation across a wide swath of American society. They repre-
sented industrial lobbies ranging from chemical manufacturers and
automobile lobbyists to insurance companies and national restaurant
and farm equipment suppliers, and poured $19 million into the 1994
congressional campaigns.23 The Project was brought together by Rep.
Thomas DeLay (R-Tex.), now the majority whip in the 104th Con-
gress.24 Project Relief began to develop a comprehensive list ofpoten-
tial initiatives and pressure points within the legislative process.25
After the November 1994 elections the Marketplace's long-simmering
resentment against the imposition ofpublic regulation suddenly found
itself with enthusiastic congressional majorities, and proceeded to
generate a parade of bills to change America and American environ-
mental law.
It is useful to catalogue some of the details of this legislative ava-
lanche, in part because the volume and complexity of the initiatives
have impeded us from comprehending the cumulative impact of the
legislation. The missed opportunities for scrutiny in turn reflect a
basic problem in following congressional maneuvering-process opac-
22 Jack Torry, GOP Unveils 'Contract,'PI'ITSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 28,1994, at AS.
23 See Michael Weisskopf& David Maraniss, Forging an Alliancefor Regulation, WASH. POST,
Mar. 12, 1995, at AI; see also Vicki Monks, Capitol Games, NAT'L WILDLIFE, Apr./May, 1996,
at 22, 22-23.
24 A pest exterminator before entering Congress, DeLay had long been convinced that envi-
ronmental concerns were extreme. He had been particularly angered by EPA's toxic chemicals
regulation. DDT is "not harmful," he asserted. ''DDT is as safe as aspirin." Kathy Sawyer, Gore's
Scientific Approach to GOP Cuts, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1996, at A17; see also Jonathan Alter
& Thomas Rosenstiel, D.C.'s Geek Chic, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1995, at 39.
25 Project Reliefs payments included contributions of $87,126 to now-Speaker Gingrich, and
more than $330,000 each to Sen. Kay Hutchinson (R-Tex.) and Sen. Larry Craig (R-Idaho), both
leaders in Senate regulatory reform initiatives. See Monks, supra note 23, at 23; see also ESA:
Members Got $65 Millionjrom PACs Opposing Endangered Species Protection, Nat. Envtl.
Daily (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1996) (noting a report issued by the D.C.-based Environmental Working
Group revealing sums donated by antienvironmental PACs to legislators).
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ity. In order for public opinion and public accountability to bear upon
congressional actions, what Congress does must be visible. The an-
tigovernmental initiatives of the 104th Congress's :first session were
so fast, furious, numerous, and often obscurely technical, that the
press largely was caught flatfooted and proved unable to cope. Thus,
the public too saw only a blur.26
Here are a few vivid object lessons coming from the 104th Congress
in its :first year that provide a glimpse into the agenda and posture of
the majority blocs that seized the initiative in January 1994. The
examples chosen actually passed one or both chambers of Congress.
They reveal a tendency to undercut public regulation of private en-
terprise generally, and environmental protection in particular. More-
over, their terms reflect a continuation of the Coasian tendency to
externalize industrial costs, as well as direct authorship by the af-
fected interests.
A. The Regulatory Moratorium Bill
On February 24, 1995, the House of Representatives passed House
Bill 450, the "Regulatory Transition Act of 1995," initially drafted by
Gordon Gooch, a Project Relief lobbyist for the petrochemical indus-
try, which included as its major provision a freeze and rollback of
federal regulations.27 Section 3(a) of the bill provided that "a federal
agency may not take any regulatory rulemaking action until the end
of the moratorium period, unless an exception is provided . . . ."28
Exceptions were provided in section 5 only if:
the administrator ... finds in writing that a waiver for the action
is (a) necessary because of an imminent threat to health or safety
or other emergency, or (b) necessary for the enforcement of crimi-
26 See Joe Davis, The Scoop that Never Was, AMIcus J., Summer 1995, at 18 (noting how even
the most extreme legislative erosions of environmental protection, like the "Timber Salvage"
rider, were scarcely examined by the media, and hence resulted in raids on public values and
the public domain).
Z1 H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Its lead sponsor was GOP whip Rep. Tom DeLay.
H.R. 450 passed the House on Feb. 24,1995 with a vote of 276 to 146.141 CONGo REC. D239--01
(daily ed. Feb. 24, 1995). Senate Bill 219, S. 219, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), a similar but more
limited measure, passed the Senate on March 29, 1995. See 141 CONGo REC. 84758 (daily ed. Mar.
29, 1995). Sponsored by Don Nickles (R-Okla.), it also sought to create a formal process giving
Congress 45 days to review and reject a final regulation before it takes effect. Project Relief
lobbyists were instrnmental in shaping a nnmber ofthe moratorinm's provisions. Marlin Walker,
Environment: License to Pollute, GUARDIAN, Sept. 6, 1995, at 4.
28 H.R. 450, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 3(a) (1995). The bill covered a period beginning November
20, 1994 and ending whenever the President signed a mandatory regulatory cosUbenefit analysis
and risk assessment statute, or December 31, 1995. [d. § 6(2).
HeinOnline -- 23 B. C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 744 1995-1996
744 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:733
nallaws .... [or by § 6(3)(b) where the agency is] repealing,
narrowing, or streamlining a rule, regulation, or administrative
process or otherwise reducing regulatory burdens, ... [or which
OMB certifies] is limited to a routine administrative function.29
The scope of the moratorium is breathtaking, going far beyond
environmental regulations and in one stroke eliminating most federal
regulations passed, pending, or proposed over an entire year. In fact,
rules would be suspended without knowing what they were. Congress
prepared no inventory to list which, or even how many, regulations
would be affected.30 Estimates put the number of regulations that
would have been suspended by the Senate bill at 900, and by the
House bill at 4300131
What kind of regulations would the bill have nullified? The structure
offederal laws has been so interwoven into modern society that virtually
every area of public-private concern would have been touched.32 That
this far-reaching, yet unconsidered, moratorium bill captured such a
rousing majority of the l04th Congress, particularly the bloc of sev-
enty-three freshmen, shows not only a gut resentment against gov-
ernmental restraints, but also a mugwumpian readiness to launch
29 Id. § 5. One other exception was added on the floor to validate rules allowing hunting and
fishing seasons to proceed. Id. § 6(A)(4). This reflected a Senate amendment, No. 415, offered
by Senator Pryor CD-Ark.) to ensure that ''migratory bird hunting season will not be canceled
or interrupted, and that commercial, recreational or subsistence activities related to hunting,
fishing, or camping will not be cancelled or interrupted." 141 CONGo REO. 84705-02 (daily ed.
Mar. 28, 1995).
30 The House bill did, however, ask the President to prepare a report that would tell them
after the fact what they had done. The bill provided that "[n]ot later than 30 days after the date
ofthe enactment of this act, the president shall conduct an inventory and publish in the Federal
Register a list of all regulatory rulemaking actions covered by subsection (a)." H.R. 450, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1995).
31 Senate Gets Moratorium Bill; Demor:rats Likely to Battle, HAZMAT TRANSPORT NEWS,
Mar. 13, 1995, at l.
32 As an example, taking just one randomly chosen day's rulemaking notices in the Federal
Register, November 22, 1995, there were 26 rulemakings that appeared to fall under the
suspensions of the moratorium bill, 12 of them final and 14 proposed rulemakings. 59 Fed. Reg.
60,061 (1995). They included a few environmental regulations, like acid rain rules, air quality
control rules, ocean fishing quotas for Alaska, and a favorite target of the grazing lobby, the
reintroduction of endangered gray wolves into Yellowstone Park. Id. at 60,061-284. But they
also included airplane airworthiness certification rules, insurance for disabled veterans, licensing
of local radio and TV stations, milk and citrus subsidies, immigration rules, air traffic control
airspace definitions, voter registration, prison inmate pretrial procedures, food stamp rules,
Federal Reserve rules, and provisions for paying state governments certain expenses in imple-
menting federal programs. Id.
The Alaska fishing quota rules are an example ofgovernment rules that are needed by market
forces in order to protect the market's own resource base. See Plater, First Principles, supra
note 1, at 674-77.
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sweeping, simplistic measures to clear the decks without considering
consequences.
Something in most of us resents regulation. The resentment builds
on our continuing frontier fantasy that to some extent we are still
rugged individualists living on the edge of wilderness. But in truly
conservative terms, in the sense that conservatism is grounded in a
precautionary principle, it is surprising that the House majority could
propose to wipe out a vast amount of sub-delegated adjectival law-
making-authorized by statutes over the last fifty years and proc-
essed through elaborate procedures established under the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act and the United States Constitution-with so
little intellection. In addition to the fact that legislators did not know
what rules the moratorium would nullify, there were virtually no
legislative hearings (unless one counts talk radio) for the moratorium
bill or for many of the other bills in the Contract agenda. The Article
I legislative process, as it had been known over the last 100 plus years,
was substantially bypassed. The moratorium seems to have been an
exercise of brute political force.
B. The Bill Amending the Clean Water Act
As an example of the Contract's initiatives on a substantive pollu-
tion control regulatory system, consider House Bill 961, a bill amend-
ing major aspects of the Clean Water Act (CWA).33 The CWA has been
one of the three major pollution control statutory frameworks devel-
oped by bipartisan coalitions in Congress since 1970.34
The fundamental perception that led to the passage of the CWA
was that, left to their own, the states had been unable to implement
adequate pollution protection. Without federal minimum standards,
an intense interstate competition for jobs and revenues sets up a "race
to the bottom," a "race of laxity," a "pollution competition," in which
states have powerful incentives to lower environmental standards.
States that enforce environmental protections tend to lose their in-
dustries to states that have less stringent enforcement systems. As a
result, state governments generally have been more susceptible than
33 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also 141 CONGo REO. D612-01 (daily ed. May 16,
1995) (showing the House passing H.R. 961 by a vote of 240 to 185).
31 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994) (initially referred to as the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972). The other nominees for most significant pollution acts are the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994), and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994).
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the federal government to the lobbying blandishments of industry.36
In addition to the threats from a race to the bottom, federal interven-
tion was necessary because pollution is an interstate problem.30
But water pollution control costs industry large amounts of money.
The federal enforcement scheme for the CWN.s National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program was bitterly re-
sented for toughening standards beyond state water quality require-
ments. Echoing the classic industrial bromide, Rep. Zach Wamp (R-
Tenn.) proclaimed that with the House's proposed changes to the
CWA, "[w]e're bringing the pendulum back to the middle."37
1. Generally Applicable Changes Under H.R. 961
H.R. 961 generally aimed to diminish the federal role that had been
established as a threshold necessity from the inception of the CWA.
H.R. 961's lead sponsor, Rep. Bud Shuster (R-Pa.), claimed that the
bill would give states and local communities flexibility in controlling
pollution in their waterways. Shuster argued that the bill would not
reduce environmental protection because "the states still have the
right to impose whatever standards they choose to impose . . . ."38
That argument deftly ignored history and incorporated questionable
and revealing premises-that states will have the ability and desire
to enforce pollution standards despite interstate competition for in-
dustry, that environmental protection can be achieved with noncoor-
dinated efforts, and that provisions to lower standards and proce-
dures would not compromise water quality protection as a result.
35 A shift back to state-level regulation has been one ofthe themes ofrecent antienvironmental
market initiatives, not based on any consistent theory of state's rights, but based on the
pragmatic basis that most state governments are vulnerable to market political pressures. The
104th Congress concurrently has attempted to override state common law remedies. See infra
text accompanying note 92.
35 More than 20 states receive more than 50% of their water pollution from other states, and
an additional 15 states receive 25-50%. Data from a U.S Geological Survey report cited in
Randolph E. Schmid, Polluted Water: Perils ofLiving Downstream, AP Wire Service, June 2,
1995, available in Westlaw (ASSOCPPS), 1995 WL 4390992; 'l'raveling Pollution 'l'racked by
Study, Contamination Arrives Vm Ohio, Missouri, Mississippi Rivers, CHARLESTON DAILY
MAIL, June 3, 1995, at P5B; Water Needs National Rules; Scientific Report Rebuts Thrust of
House Bill, BUFFALO NEWS, June 11, 1995, at F8.
37 H.J. Hebert, House Begins Debate on Bill Rewriting Clean Water Act, AP Wire Service,
May 10, 1995, available in Westlaw (ASSOCPPS), 1995 WL 6727639.
38 Id.; H.J. Hebert, House Panel Passes Bill Easing Water-Poll1ttion Controls, AP Wire
Service, Apr. 6, 1995, available in Westlaw (ASSOCPPS), 1995 WL 6722991. Section 101 of H.R.
961 announces a new emphasis upon state efforts in regulating water pollution (although in fact
the old CWA and Clean Air Act had the same kind of declaration, their terms emphatically
asserted binding federal minimum standards).
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Whatever the states define as sufficient water quality protection,
apparently, would be enough. The House bill would have created a sea
change in the national approach to water quality. The federal govern-
ment's primary role in pollution regulation would no longer be the
minimum floor that secures national water quality.
Here are some of H.R. 961's strategic changes for the CWA:
• Multiplying administrative procedures:
The bill requires judicially reviewable cost-benefit analysis and risk
assessment procedures before the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) can promulgate
any standard, effluent limitation, water quality criterion, or other
CWA requirement (other than a permit or procedural requirement),
or issue any guidance, that would result in annual cost increases to
the regulated community of $25 million or more, unless EPA or the
Corps certifies that net benefits to society exceed the monetary costS.39
Risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis have been tactical favorites
of the anti-regulation lobbyists, spawning several plenary cost-benefit
requirement bills as well.40 The requirement sounds fundamentally
rational, but sets up so many procedural hoops that public interest
advocates call it "paralysis by analysis."
• Eliminating statutory deadlines:
Since 1972 the CWA has incorporated set deadlines for required
administrative implementation stages, which, though often missed,
nevertheless put pressure on EP.Ns judicially overseen regulatory
process-a process that otherwise tends to bog down in protracted
negotiations with regulated industries. H.R. 961 would replace statu-
tory deadlines with the subjective (and thus difficult to enforce) re-
quirement that standards be implemented "within a reasonable pe-
riod of time as determined by the administrator or the state, as
appropriate, considering facility planning, design, construction, and
other implementation factors,"41 inviting traditional market arguments
for continuing delays in water quality regulation.
• De-defining point sources:
The trigger to the CW.Ns most intensive regulatory requirements
is the point source; every point source requires a permit. Nonpoint
sources are scarcely regulated. In some cases, rather than redefining
39 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 302, 307, 324(b) (1995). Section 302 also provides that
the state may apply its own balancing calculus: "The state may consider information reasonably
available on the likely social, economic, energy use, and environmental cost associated with
attaining such standards in relation to the benefits to be attained." Id. § 302.
40 See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
41 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1995).
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standards downward, the bill responds to particular lobby pressures
by declaring that such point source discharges are not point sources.42
• Weakening standards:
The bill repeals the current requirement for states to develop Total
Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) on water quality-limited stretches
in all cases.43 Under the bill, states would only be required to establish
TMDLs to the extent that they deem them "necessary to achieve
reasonable progress toward the attainment or maintenance"44 of water
quality standards, again inviting the competitive pressures upon states
to undercut state water quality efforts.
• Weakening the enforcement basis of standards:
One provision blocks enforcement of violations of whole-effluent-
toxicity standards if the permittee, after the violation, conducts a
voluntary Toxicity Reduction Evaluation.45
• Weakening nonpoint source pollution regulation:
The CWA, although not setting specific standards, requires non-
point source pollution to be subject to ''best management practices."46
The House bill strikes the word ''best.''47 The current CWA also re-
quires that state programs be designed "to achieve implementation
of the best management practices ...."48 The bill, however, replaces
that standard with a weaker, more subjective instruction "to manage
· .. nonpoint sources to the degree necessary to provide for reasonable
further progress toward the goal of attaining water quality standards
within 15 years of approval of the state program."49 Nonpoint source
42 Section 322 of H.R. 961 states, for example, that animal feedlot wastes are not to be called
point sources even when they are piped directly into a stream, thus oveniding existing prece-
dent. See Concerned Area Residents For The Environment (CARE) v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d
114, 120 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 793 (1995). These discharges, then,
would be virtually unregulated. Likewise stormwater runoff in urban areas would not be
regulated, discarding a program that had been developed in negotiations over the past 10 years.
H.R 961, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 322 (1995).
43 See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(I)(D).
44 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 308 (1995).
45 [d. § 310.
46 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A).
47 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 319(b)(2) (1995).
43 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
49 Moreover, H.R. 961 provides for further suspensions of that deadline by one year for every
year that Congress underfunds the program, a self-fulfilling invitation to delay. H.R. 961, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 319(b)(2). The bill also would repeal § 6217 of the Coastal Zone Management
Act Amendments of 1990 which made a small move toward nonpoint source pollution control in
coastal zone areas. [d. § 308.
The bill also would establish a statutory hierarchy for nonpoint source control measures. [d.
§ 319. Under that hierarchy, the EPA should seek compliance-first by voluntary action; second
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pollution, which constitutes a huge portion of pollution load on some
water bodies, has always been the weak sibling of the water quality
provisions, and now would be forced to take a further step back.
• Straight exemptions:
The bill also contains some straight exemptions that reflect particu-
lar members' affiliations and local grievances-exempting sewage from
secondary treatment requirements in San Diego, the island of Puerto
Rico, and communities under 20,000;50 exempting various coal mining
operations from water quality compliance;51 exempting certain agri-
cultural lands from wetlands protections;52 and declaring that water
quality standards of CWA section 401 do not apply to dam projects
when hydroelectric licensing raises questions about effects upon down-
stream water quality and fish mortality.53
2. Specifically Targeting Wetlands Under H.R. 961
H.R. 961 directed even sharper attacks against the CWits protec-
tion of wetlands, reflecting legislative animus against what Rep. James
Hayes (D-La.) has characterized as a serious clash between "the
rights of individuals and the power of the government," in which
government had to be rolled back.54
Wetlands have evolved in prominence over the past few decades as
ecologists have discovered their important natural functions and mar-
ket forces have found that wetlands often lie in the way of develop-
ment. Modern science has documented the role of wetlands in reduc-
ing the frequency, peak levels, and volume offlood waters; in recharging
groundwater supplies; in providing reproductive and shelter habitat
for fish and wildlife; and in supporting many ecological cycles and
aesthetic amenities.55
by giving pollution prevention and other economic incentives to industry; and last, (if all else
fails) by mandatory measures. ld. § 319(b)(2)(B).
50 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 309(t) (1995).
61 See id. § 107.
62 See id. § 803(g)(2).
63 See id. § 507(b). The hydroelectric provision overrides the Supreme Court's decision in PUD
No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department ofEcology which held that the FERC
licensing process cannot undercut state water quality standards. -U.S.-, 114 S.Ot. 1900, 1914
(1994); see H.R. 961, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 507(b) (1995).
f>I Hebert, supra note 37.
65 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS: AN
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT 19--29 (1978) [hereinafter OUR NATION'S WETLANDS]; see
also PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 444-48. In its pioneering Charles River Study
(1972), the U.S. Array Corps of Engineers (New England Division) demonstrated that compre-
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Market forces, in turn, have felt increasing irritation with the ex-
pansion of federal and state wetlands protection since the late 1960s.66
Up to that time, roughly half of the nation's wetlands had been lost
in a seemingly inexorable march of land development. The remaining
wetland areas generally had survived because of their marginality.
But burgeoning population pressures, coupled with a frontier mental-
ity of constantly looking for virgin terrain,67 have made wetlands
become increasingly attractive to developers. Previously marginal
wetlands feed a land market appetite because oftheir relatively lower
cost or because filling them allows aggregation of larger developable
tracts.58
Here is what H.R. 961 would do to wetlands if passed:
e Narrow the definition of wetlands:
The current legal definition of wetlands revolves around ecological
considerations-specifically vegetation, soil, and hydrology.69 The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences prepared a long-awaited report entitled
Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries (Report), which was re-
leased in time for the House debate on H.R. 961.60 The Report ex-
hensive protection of existing wetlands in the Charles River watershed would produce more
protection from floods than $4 billion worth of traditional concrete control works, dikes, dams,
and levees. See grmerally U.S. CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CHARLES RIVER WATERSHED, MASSA-
CHUSE'ITS (1972).
56 Wetlands protection became tangible when the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act resurfaced in
the late 1960s as an enforceable water statute, and subsequently the National Environmental
Policy Act CNEPA) was held to imply environmental responsibilities upon the Corps. See Zabel
v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 213 (5th Cir. 1970), em. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); PLATER ET AL., NLS,
supra note 18, at 322-27.
57 One of the chief differences between development in the U.S. and elsewhere is the sprawl
and chaotic settlement patterns that reflect most private developers' tendency to want to stm·t
out with a clean slate. There seems to be a reluctance to consolidate investment and redevel-
opment on previously developed land. As developers continually look to the remaining undevel-
oped areas in a region to provide larger tracts and lower-cost siting, human development
sprawls outward in an ad hoc and highly inefficient automobile-based settlement pattern.
68 Wetlands became so controversial that the Reagan Administration attempted to recall and
destroy all copies of Our Nation's Wetlands, supra note 55, a report prepared by federal
agencies to show the economic, ecological, and aesthetic values of wetlands. In the Bush
Administration, faced with the President's campaign promise of "no net loss of wetlands," Vice
President Quayle led efforts to permit increased development ofwetlands by changing the legal
definition of what counted as a wetland. Michael Weisskopf, Wetlands Protection and tlte
Struggle Over Environmental Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1991, at A17 (detailing debate over
definition of ''wetlands'' and reporting that Quayle went from proposing to define wetlands as
areas that were covered by water 80% of the time, to proposing "when it's wet, it's wet").
69 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1995); see also United States Corps of Engineers, CORPS OF ENGI-
NEERS WETLANDS DELINEATION MANuAL 13-14 (1987) (defining wetlands).
60 Michael Terrazas, H.R. 961 Limits Federal Wetland Protection, AM. CITY & COUNTY, July
1995, at 20.
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pressed general satisfaction with the CWA section 404 program as
presently administered. It asserted that isolated and headwater wet-
lands and riparian zones required even stricter regulation. The Re-
port, however, was ignored in the final bill. The bill would truncate
the definition of wetlands to a strict twenty-one day saturation re-
quirement and add a variety of functional tests unrelated to scientific
standards-all of which would result in a major reduction in the
amount of wetlands protected from dredge and fill.61
• Narrow federal jurisdiction:
H.R. 961 provides that no U.S. waters or wetlands shall be subject
to CWN.s section 404 protections based solely on the fact that migra-
tory birds use or could use the waters or wetlands.62 There has been
a running argument about federal commerce clause jurisdiction over
wetlands that are not connected directly or indirectly to navigable
waters.63 Many of the nation's remaining wetlands are "isolated wet-
lands"-swales, ''potholes,'' and inland bogs that are not so connected-
and their importance for migratory waterfowl was the basis for a
finding of section 404 jurisdiction in Hoffman Homes v. Administra-
tor U.S. E.P.A.,64 which the provision would override. Past wetlands
cases also could have their federal jurisdiction reopened to challenges
under this provision.
• Impose a market-oriented balance upon wetlands protection:
The bill contains a general exhortation to the EPA administrator.
[I]n implementing his or her responsibilities under the regulatory
program under this section, the secretary shall balance the objec-
tive of conserving functioning wetlands with the objective of en-
suring continued economic growth, providing essential infrastruc-
ture, maintaining strong state and local tax bases, and protecting
against the diminishment of the use and value of privately owned
property.65
61 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1995). Previously, the agencies had used a definition
of wetlands based on ecological parameters, and rejected a 1989 proposal to use a 14-day
saturation test. H.R. 961's new 21-day definition would be even less protective than this
rejected proposal.
62Id.
63 The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the extent of "waters of the United
States" where they are unconnected to navigable waters. See United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-35 (1985). A recent case, decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, asserted federal jurisdiction based on such a com-
merce linkage and a migratory bird treaty. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Administrator U.S.
E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993).
&I Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261-62.
65 H.R. 961, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803 (1995).
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The effect of this charge is unclear, since the process in which such
standards would apply is not specified. The drift of it, however, is
clearly to undercut the ecological bases of current wetlands protection.
• Require compensation for regulation of wetlands:
H.R. 961, acting on a statutory, rather than a constitutional basis,60
would force the government to "compensate an owner of property
whose use of any portion of that property has been limited by an
agency action under this section that diminishes the fair market value
of that portion by twenty percent or more."67 It directs the federal
government to compensate a property owner when a wetlands deter-
mination, permit denial, or permit condition causes any portion ofthe
prope1"ty to decrease in value by greater than twenty percent. If the
diminution in value is greater than fifty percent, the federal govern-
ment must, at the owner's option, buy the burdened portion of the
property.68
• Rank wetlands and cap category protections:
H.R. 961 requires the Corps, upon receiving a permit application,
to classify a wetland as either 'JYpe A, B, or C, in declining rank of
importance.69 'JYpe A wetlands, the most valuable, are subject to a
"sequencing" of protective standards that weigh the "practicability"
of protection, thus internalizing a balancing factor in favor of devel-
opment.70 'JYpe B wetlands permitting is to be based on a determina-
tion of "the public interest" as measured by a benefit-cost analysis.
'JYpe C wetlands lose protection entirely. In states where the Corps
decides that there exist "sufficient conserved wetlands to provide
66 The constitutional challenges to wetlands regulations in the courts have been significant,
but largely have failed to cripple wetlands protection. See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18,
at 449-53. It often comes down to a "baseline game." If the court finds that landowners retain
a reasonable remaining economic use for their land, on consideration of the entire parcel and
not just the regulated portion, regulations are usually sustained. Justice Stevens's majority
holding in Keystone Bituminous Coal v. DeBenedicts basing the takings calculus on the entire
property owned, has generally been followed except in Federal Circuit holdings. 480 U.S. 470,
480 (1987); see Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
bane). The divide-and-conquer definition process urged in Justice Rehnquist's Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal dissent, advocating what Prof. Radin has called "conceptual severance," appar-
ently proves too much. Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception ofProperty: Cross C1Lrrents
in the Jurisprudence ofTakings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1674 (1988).
67 H.R. 961, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 803(d) (1995).
68 Id. Compensation is not necessary where the administrative action is intended to prevent
a public health or safety hazard or damage to specific neighbOling property.
69 Id. § 803(e).
70 Moreover, no more than 20% of a county could be designated as highest-value, Type A,
wetlands, even in the Everglades.
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adequate wetlands conservation," 'TYPe A and B wetlands restrictions
can be applied "only where economically practicable" and mitigation
requirements are prohibited.
The CWA amendments bill is evidently the product of a heavy-
handed industrial lobbying process that overrode the civic-minded
water quality protection ethic of Congresses since 1972. Instead of
maintaining a federal baseline upon which market decisions have to
be made, the bill would have reduced water resource regulation to a
sidebar theme dominated by short-term economic practicability. The
bill's shifting of authority to the states appears to have been driven
by the same pressures that necessitated a federal act in the first place,
the tendency of industrial producers to push for lower standards that
created the invidious interstate race of laxity prior to the 1970s.
C. Appropriations and Appropriations Riders
1. Appropriations
The appropriations process is historically one of the most powerful
and least visible mechanisms ofcongressional lawmaking. Substantive
bills from substantive committees are more visible. They address
tangible subject matters, definable policy positions, and statutory
terminology that invite debate. Appropriations bills, on the other
hand, are focused on funding and can hide their dramatic effects
within hundreds of lines of numerical quantities, but their impact can
be drastic.
Concurrently with substantive initiatives, the Contactarians launched
an appropriations strategy that some environmentalists dubbed a
"Stealth Attack" on environmentallaw.71 The appropriations assault
included massive across-the-board cuts and particularized cuts, along
with riders that, by their terms, effectively nullified specific regula-
tory programs. On the grand scale, appropriations reductions paral-
lelled some of the budget authority conflicts in which the federal
government has repeatedly been brought to the brink of default. In
order to obtain the chaotic parade of continuing budget resolutions
from a recalcitrant House, the Clinton Administration has been forced
71 Natural Resources Defence Council, Stealth Attack: Gutting Environmental Protection
Through the Budget Process (July 1995).
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to accept continuing twenty-five percent cutbacks in EPA and De-
partment of Interior budgets.
The EPA appropriations bill is a vivid case in point. House Bill 2099
would have cut the agency's total multiprogram budget by a full thirty
percent, from 1995's $7.2 billion down to $4.9 billion.72 These cuts affect
the budget of an agency that has been charged with implementing an
ever-expanding list of dozens ofmajor programs, from toxics and lead
paint poisoning to ozone, asbestos, and wetlands.
Even more illuminating were reductions in funding for enforce-
ment. H.R. 2099 specifically cut the budget for enforcement activities
down to $1.8 billion, a drastic fifty percent cut from the preceding
year.73 If agency representatives do not have the resources to go into
the field to inspect ongoing industrial activities (and there are recur-
ring stories of federal officials unable to visit a plant or field because
they lack transportation), then the laws for practical purposes are as
good as suspended.
2. Appropriations Riders
And then there were the riders. The EPA funding bill as originally
passed by the House contained more than a dozen riders that tran-
sparently revealed the influence of different industriallobbyists.74
Here's what Title III of H.R. 2099 would do to EPA funding:
• Prohibit spending any funds for implementation, enforcement, or
research on pollution standards for organo-chlorine and other toxic
residues in the Great Lakes-a potential enforcement program that
concerned industries discharging into Great Lakes, and the chlorine
industry in particular.
72 H.R. 2099, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed by the House July 2, 1995).
73 [d. at Title III.
74 [d. Similar strategies often have been used in other contexts. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchin-
son (R-Tex.) hitched to H.R. 889, the Defense Appropriations Act, a rider rescinding $1.5 million
from the Department of Interior and prohibiting the listing of endangered and threatened
species and critical habitat. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for
the Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-6, Tit. II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995).
In a similar maneuver focused on Interior, Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Ca.) attached a lider to the
Fiscal 1996 Interior Appropriations Bill, H.R. 1977, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), designed to
circumvent the California Desert Protection Act of 1994 by appropriating only $1.00 to the
National Park Service to manage the new Mojave National Preserve. To fill the inevitable
management gap, the bill gave the development-minded Bureau of Land Management (which
formerly received $1.5 million ammally to manage the same area) $599,999 to manage the
Preserve.
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• Prohibit spending funds for a stormwater permitting program, as
well as the EPA oversight of sewer overflows that was resented by
municipal government officials.
• Prohibit EPA from any actions regulating wetlands under the
CWN.s section 404, leaving that role completely to the more pliant
Corps.
• Freeze the development and implementation of new or revised
effluent limitation guidelines and standards, pretreatment standards,
or new source performance standards under the CWA. This provision
would have provided a strategic windfall to industries for which effluent
standards were currently pending, including the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, metal products and machinery industry, and the pulp and
paper industry.
• Prohibit funding of any requirement that a state implement trip
reduction measures (i.e., limits on traffic volumes) aimed at reducing
vehicular emissions under section 304 of the Clean Air Act.
• Prohibit use of funds "to develop, propose, promulgate, issue,
enforce, or to set or enforce compliance deadlines or issuance sched-
ules for maximum achievable control technology standards"-a pro-
vision sought by air polluting industry to undercut a compromise on
toxic emissions under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
• Prevent risk management plan requirements under section 112(r)
of the Clean Air Act from being extended to the domestic oil and gas
industry and the natural gas industry. Under the statute, chemical
accident prevention programs, which require such things as hazards
estimates, worst case scenario planning, prevention plans, and emer-
gency preparedness planning, are all open for public review. Because
EPA final rules are not yet in force, this rider would completely stop
the program.
• Prevent promulgation of further safe drinking water standards
for radioactivity or arsenic contaminations-a loophole apparently
sought by several state governments facing expensive water purifica-
tion costs.
• Prevent tightening of regulation or closing down of toxic chemical
incineration by the cement kiln industry, which has developed a major
sideline in burning toxics.
• Prevent EPA from forcing companies to disclose toxic chemical
data under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act or section 8 of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
• Override the Delaney Clause, section 409 of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, which prohibits any amounts of cancer-caus-
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ing pesticides or additives in processed food. For years critics have
assaulted this provision as overly strict and deserving of a risk bal-
ance, while other voices supported the clause as a necessarily stark
standard. The rider shortcuts the debate on behalf of the food and
agriculture industries.
• Prohibit use of voluntary environmental audit reports to assess
an administrative, civil, or criminal negligence penalty where states
recently have passed audit privileges, a provision that facilitates im-
munity against prosecution and was pushed in Congress by the Cor-
porate Environmental Enforcement Council75 and the Corporate Com-
pliance Management and Policy Group.
The range and precision76 of these appropriations provisions are
instructive, illuminating the interests dominating the legislative proc-
ess and the nature of a process in which appropriations riders typi-
cally are not noticed by the press, much less debated by the public.
In this case, however, national environmental groups were able to
attract press attention to the array of industry riders, and ultimately
:firmed up President Clinton's veto of the bill, leaving H.R. 2099 one
artifact of the counterrevolution that did not come to pass.
D. Other Antienvironmental Initiatives in the 104th Congress
In a normal congressional session, three such sweeping legislative
initiatives as we have noted-one on administrative process, one on
a major substantive statutory system, and one on appropriations-
would have dominated debate through an entire session. But there
was more. The 104th Congress and the market forces that guided its
anti-regulatory agenda addressed so many more issues that they
moved by in a blur, each scarcely registering in media attention before
another came along.
Here are some of the 104th Congress's further initiatives:
• "Regulatory reform" through risk assessment and cost-benefit pro-
cedures:
'I\vo bills that supposedly streamlined bureaucratic procedures by
requiring rational cost-benefit accounting before regulations could be
75 The group includes AT&T, BFGoodrich, Coors Breweries, Eli Lilly Co., Kaiser Industlies,
Hoechst Celanese, Polaroid, Textron, and others.
76 Some riders had little or nothing to do with expenditures, like a CWA override for Kala-
mazoo, Michigan's sewage plant, and riders encouraging EPA to facilitate Indian tribes in
opening toxic waste dumps on reservation lands.
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promulgated are the "Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995"
billTI and its Senate equivalent, the "Comprehensive Regulatory Re- .
form Act of 1995" bill78 sponsored by Senator Robert Dole (R-Ran.).
The terms of the bills, however, would set up an excruciating series
of procedural and analytical roadblocks before agencies can put for-
ward environmentally protective regulations, while exempting pesti-
cide approvals and similar economically permissive rules.
There is a fundamental rationality and logic, of course, about as-
sessing risks, benefits, and costs before policies and actions are imple-
mented. In our governing system, however, this process cannot be a
simple exercise in digital calculations. Even some economists, who
surely would have loved to find otherwise, have concluded that it was
naive to think that they or anyone could make risk assessment and
benefit cost calculations that would specify where to peg particular
public health and environmental standards.79 Risk assessment and
benefit cost analysis are important parts of the policy debate, but are
not instrumental calculations. The bills in Congress, however, require
a positive calculation before regulation can go forward. It appears
likely, therefore, that the intent of the risk assessment and benefit
cost analysis legislation is not to achieve more rational regulation, but
rather, to achieve regulatory "paralysis by analysis."
• Regulatory compensation:
House Bill 925, the "Private Property Protection Act" bill, was yet
another attack on the environment.so Landowners who claim that any
portion of their lands (echoing the conceptual severance argument
noted earlier!) has been reduced in value by regulation by twenty
percent would be entitled to compensation from the taxpayers, and if
the government does not pay, the regulation would be unenforceable.82
The Senate "Omnibus Property Rights Act" bill, sponsored by Sena-
tor Dole and thirty-one others purportedly "to clarify constitutional
takings tests," would apply similar provisions, would require a "pri-
T1 H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed by House Mar. 3, 1995).
78 H.R. 2586, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Title III (1995).
79 See generally RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, WORST THINGS FIRST?: THE DEBATE OVER
RISK-BASED NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (A. Finkel & D. Golding, eds., 1994);
Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 251 (1995).
so H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed by House Mar. 3, 1995).
81 See supra note 66.
52 Under a substitute politically retrenched version of the bill offered by Rep. Billy Tauzin
(D-La.), the bill would primarily target compensation on the Endangered Species Act, the
wetlands protections ofthe CWA, and federal laws that protect water flow in the arid West. See
141 CONGo REC. 2394 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995).
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vate property taking impact analysis" of federal rules, and would
greatly expand the jurisdiction of the regulation-skeptical Court of
Federal Claims.83
The regulatory compensation initiative would change the funda-
mental nature of government, asserting that government must pay
to protect public values.84 From a sovereign public trustee, govern-
ment becomes an involuntary market player, forced either to act as a
brokerage house in the sky, accumulating and monetizing the benefits
of public regulation85 and paying off the private enterprises burdened
by regulation, or to cease to regulate-which presumably is the real
agenda.
• Unfunded mandates:
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 199586 raises substantial
questions about the federal government's "cooperative federalism"
strategy of making state agencies, rather than federal enforcement
officials, the primary instruments for applying environmental quality
standards. If the unfunded mandates law were applied in its strictest
terms, states no longer would have to support enforcement of existing
water and air pollution standards or perform certain oversight of
toxics.87 In a massive shuddering of governmental machinery, all of
these functions either would shift to an overburdened and unfunded
Washington bureaucracy or the federal government would have to
pay states to enforce these health and safety regulations-an impos-
sibility.
• "Timber Salvage":
The so-called "Timber Salvage" rider, attached to the Oklahoma
City Disaster Assistance bill, has dramatically increased logging of
ancient forests.88 The rider mandates the United States Forest Serv-
ice and United States Bureau of Land Management to award con-
tracts for timber sales through 1997. These sales would include sales
83 S. 605, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403 (1995). On the Court of Federal Claims' aggressive
compensation bent, see generally Thomas Hanley, Comment, A Developer's Dream: The United
States Clainu; Court's New Analysis ofSection 404 Takings Challenges, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 317 (1991).
84 See generally DeCosse, supra note 13.
BS Presumably by new and imaginative forms of taxation.
86 Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995) (signed into law by President Clinton Mar. 2, 1996).
I>l This would occur under the Act if Congress failed to pass a motion authorizing unfunded
mandates in each case. See id.
86 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Ter-
rorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occun'ed at Oklahoma
City, and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194,240 (1995).
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of green timber, not just fire-damaged trees, even if the sales are
below cost to the government. The agencies must conduct these sales
at a greater volume than they currently do, and are ordered to ignore
the provisions of environmental statutes such as the Endangered
Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as
well as any judicial decisions prior to the date of enactment. Further-
more, these sales are exempt from administrative review, and the
rider prohibits courts from issuing preliminary injunctions with re-
spect to any aspect of timber sales. The timber industry orchestrated
the rider, and subsequently has broadened it even further through
court action.89
• Endangered Species:
A rider attached to House Bill 889, the Defense Appropriations Act,
signed into law April 10, 1995, prohibits the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service from listing endangered and threatened species and
critical habitat.90 Moreover, aside from this rider, the Endangered
Species Act, which currently requires reauthorization, is the subject
of a number of pending bills that would drastically reduce its enforce-
able protections.91
• Federal overrides of state tort laws:
Another battlefield is the common law. Drawing upon numerous
anecdotes of tort law excesses, an initiative has long been building to
cut back on plaintiffs' access to judicial remedies. House Bill 1075, the
"Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995" bill
would cut back substantially on the ability of plaintiffs to certify class
actions, to maintain product liability litigation, and to seek damages
beyond straight compensation.92 The ''loser-pays'' proposal would like-
59 For more on the "Timber Salvage" rider, see generally Congress and President Enact The
Most Anti-Environmental Law in Histmy, SAVE AMERICAN FORESTS, Wmter 1995--96. The
industry persuaded a federal judge to order the Forest Service to interpret the rider in broad
geographic terms, and to reopen sales from areas held back from the past half-century oftimber
sales. Oregon Nat. Resources Council v. Jack Ward Thomas, No. 95--6272-HO, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19567, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 5, 1995) (currently on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
90 Pub. L. No. 104-6, 109 Stat. 73 (1995).
91 The major bills attacking the current levels of protection are the "Young-Pombo" bill, H.R.
2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), and the ''Kempthorne'' bill, S. 1364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
92 See H.R. 1075, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (passed the House Mar. 10, 1995). The Senate
passed the bill with extensive amendments on May 10, 1995, and no further chamber approvals
have followed. 141 CONGo REO. S6369 (daily ed. May 10, 1995).
Attempts to chill the common law are not only a feature of the federal political scene. In
Alaska, for example, a recent statute provides that private nuisance actions cannot be brought
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wise mean a chilling of litigation by low-income and public interest
plaintiffs, for whom the assertion of legal rights would become a
high-stakes gamble. A little-noticed provision ofthe Senate bill would,
in addition, override the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals.93 These various restraints
on plaintiffs are targeted far beyond the reform of excesses. They
restrict the adjudicability of many externalized costs that over the
years have found practical remedy only in the courts.
Note that the House majority, which had argued for states' rights
in the CWA amendments, here is seeking to impose a federal override
of state common law. The clear implication from this inconsistency is
that the majority is guided, not by consistent principles of states'
rights, but rather by service to market forces.
There are dozens more antienvironmental initiatives in the pending
legislation of the 104th Congress. Examples include rolling back na-
tional parks, amending key provisions of the Clean Air Act, Super~
fund, and other toxics statutes, facilitating agricultural use of pesti~
cides, continuing large subsidies for destructive development industries,
opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling, and the
like.94 All of these initiatives reveal the power of anti-regulatory mar~
ket forces and our inability to inject civic values into the governance
process.
against industrial polluters that are in compliance with a permit, a move that uses state-wide
minimum standards to preempt plaintiffs from applying the traditional location-specific protec-
tions of common law. If plaintiffs challenge this as a regulatory taking, the Alaska statute
provides that the benefited industry shall undertake and pay for the state's defense, and pay
any compensation assessed. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.45.230 (1994).
93 S. 300, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Section 11 of S. 300 relating to reliability of expert
evidence, states: "[w]here testimony in the form of an opinion by a witness is 'sought to be used
to establish a novel scientific principle or discovery, it shall be admissible only if the principle
or discovery, or its scientific underpinning, is sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the field in which it belongs." Id. § 11. But see Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, -U.S.-, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993) ("General acceptance" held not necessary to
admit scientific evidence). .
94 See, e.g., H.R. 260, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (establishing commission for purpose of
developing list of parks to close); H.R. 53, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (directing administrator
to identify pests of significant public health importance and to implement programs to improve
and facilitate "safe" use of pesticides to combat pests); H.R. 1310, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(banning any wilderness designation and increasing motorized access to more than 90% in
Voyagers National Park).
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E. Legislative Process
In this cacophony of legislative assaults, many were targeted to
serve short-term profit maximization, rather than to implement the
social ideals that provided most of the rhetoric for the Contract with
America before the November 1994 elections. Many would conclude
that the Marketplace won the election and that environmental law
was the preordained enemy of the Limbaughian majorities that took
power.
Significantly, industrial lobbyists straightforwardly took over the
legislative process in the 104th Congress-not only drafting bills, but
also excluding agency participation in formulation of bills, bypassing
hearings, dominating debate, even sitting with majority members in
committee meetings to field questions.95 Also significant was the ab-
sence of the press, which because of the speed, bulk, complexity, and
political mood ofinevitability that accompanied the Contract's agenda,
largely failed to dissect and examine the initiatives as they poured
forth.
For a time it looked as if environmental law would be eviscerated
by the market force avalanche of 1995. As of now, pending the 1996
elections, the Contract's direct invasion of environmental law does
seem to be in remission. For the present the Contractarians:
are increasingly worried that by imposing deep cuts on environ-
mental programs they are doing even deeper political damage to
their party, and they are beginning to back away from further
confrontations on environmental issues .... Environmental pro-
grams [are becoming] a "third rail," political slang for issues like
Social Security that are best not touched because they carry such
voltage with voters.96
95 As one commentator noted:
As stunned Democrats watched in disbelief, Project Reliefs lobbyists were invited into
the congressional committee rooms and asked to draft the new laws, while the govern-
ment's own environmental experts were firmly excluded. In the judiciary committee,
lawyers from the electricity and water companies were brought in to chair staff
meetings that were drafting the [statutory provisions] for their industries.
Walker, supra note 27, at A2. Democratic members of the committees and government officials
and staff experts were left out of the drafting sessions. As one minority member noted, "[t]his
year's process has been limited almost exclusively to the regulated community." Gareth Cook,
Lawsfor Sale; Republicans in Congress Let Lobbyists Write Laws, WASH. MONTHLY, July 1995,
at 44.
!16 Cushman, supra note 8, at A2. Linda DiVall, a Republican pollster, reported to the party
leaders that:
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In the final months of the 104th Congress, because of Senator Dole's
candidacy, the leadership role in guiding anti-Clinton legislation is
passing to the Senate,97 where emphasis is likely to be upon structural
bills-regulatory cost:benefit reform, restrictions on citizen enforce-
ment remedies, and regulatory compensation bills, all of which are
poorly understood by the press and the public-rather than upon
direct attacks against environmental protection statutes.
Threats to the substance of environmental laws remain, however,
given the power of human nature and the demonstrated power and
inclination of the market forces embodied in the Wise Users, Project
Relief, and their 104th Congress. If the Contract majorities of the
104th Congress are reaffirmed in the 1996 elections, environmental
law and the civic role it represents will face again the counter-revo-
lution that currently is laying low.98 Whatever happens, the 104th
Congress has been an illuminating experience.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AS A CONSTRAINT UPON THE
DYNAMIC FORCES OF THE MARKETPLACE
Market forces are probably the most dynamic sector of human
society, for good and ill, dominating our individual lives and social
governance. The drive to maximize profits and to externalize costs in
human enterprises inevitably makes environmental law necessary,
and then bitterly resists it. Our society's environmental problems and
resistance to their solution both arise out of fundamental elements of
human nature reflected within these market forces.
some of the party's environmental policies were broadly disdained by Democrats and
Republicans alike-and by most independents, most young people, and most women.
By greater than a 2-to-1 ratio, voters have more confidence in the Democrats than
Republicans ... to protect the environment .... Most disturbing is that 55 percent of
Republicans do not trust their party when it comes to protecting the environment .•.•
Id. Significantly, the polled voters' responses were not only a reflection of whom they thought
would best serve the environment, but that protecting the environment was also a majorfactor
in shaping their inclinations to vote for one candidate over another. "Only 35 percent of the
public would vote to re-elect members of the House who supported ... cutting financing for the
[EPA] while 46 percent said they would vote not to re-elect them." Id.
97 See David Corn, Playing the Veto Game, NATION, Apr. 8, 1996, at 5.
98 For now, as Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) has said, Contract backers are not pushing for a
complete overthrow of the regulatory order. ''Maybe a mild insurrection, but not a full revolu-
tion. Look, ifyou can't get a dinner, you get a sand\vich, but regulatory reform is on the agenda."
Phillip Davis, Regulatory Reform Stirs Fears Among House Drmwcrats, National Public Radio
Morning Edition, Mar. 5, 1996.
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The human logic of the marketplace lacks a gene for altruism.
Without external constraints, social and political mechanisms driven
by individualism are dominated by short-term profit expediencies, to
the detriment of many short and long-term societal values. They do
not incorporate principles that protect the community when the in-
terests of the community and the individual enterprise diverge.
A. Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson
The basic logic remains as Ronald Coase and Rachel Carson dis-
cerned it in the 1960s-humans tend to make decisions in relatively
short-term horizons, in insulated, self-referential terms. We tend to
try to maximize our personal pleasures and profits, we strenuously
avoid and ignore burdensome liabilities if we can, and we hope or
pretend that negative consequences will disappear and not accumu-
late to the detriment of others. Coase, the economist, showed us how
this process of cost externalization is a completely logical and power-
ful tendency in individualized human behavior.99 When we are in-
volved in a productive activity, we resolutely display an inclination to
pass wide the costs, and to hold close the profits and subsidies, focus-
ing on the short-term. It is a fundamentally rational strategy in indi-
vidual terms, at least for the short-term in which most of us live. The
economics literature and Ronald Coase's 1960 article, The Problem of
Social Cost, usefully clarified important elements of human behavior,
including the nature of humans in economic enterprises and in gov-
ernment agencies.loo The fundamental perception was that all individ-
99 Coase, supra note 10, at 1. Although Coase's article was a paean to market ordering, it
served to popularize recognition of social cost externalizations. Welfare economics presumes
that individuals are powerfully motivated to externalize costs as much as possible, and cost
externalizations have long been the prime targets for environmental law's accounting process.
Coase's further argument, that the marketplace would successfully broker these costs so that
it did not matter who started out with what rights, has not withstood the test of time. It
depended, as is usual in economic theory, on an unlikely array of wistful market-favoring
premises, including perfect knowledge of what was going on, absence of effects from wide
disparities in wealth, and zero transaction costs. Coase's theories have been far more persuasive
for their underlying explanation of entrepreneurial behavior than for his market-trusting eco-
nomic prescriptions for solutions.
100 See Coase, supra note 10, at 1,3-5,42-44. Note how the human nature calculus described
by economists for individuals in the marketplace also describes the individual calculus ofagency
decisionmakers: A public official deciding whether to dream up a massive public works project
to dam a liver, drain a wetland, or build 100 miles of lumber roads into wilderness, does not
have to pay for the resources. They are already owned by government or can be paid for with
taxpayer dollars which likewise are effectively free to the official players. Losses of natural
values are traditionally costless. Agencies feel internal benefits in terms of power (political heft
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ual decisionmakers will attempt to maximize the amount of benefits
they can internalize by "externalizing" the maximum related and
consequential costs onto others who will not be able to hold them
accountable.
As a consequence there is a powerful inherent pressure, within
corporate management and market forces generally, to externalize
pollution and other social costs into the environment. In the days prior
to 1960, individual enterprises lived in a version of the frontier myth,
where each could operate independently on his own terrain, and the
negative consequences that individual actions generated would disap-
pear away into an all-absorbing tolerant vacuum.
Wistfully, like many economists, Coase thought that externalities
could be readily marketized and privately ordered, so that overall
optimal results could be brokered by the marketplace without requir-
ing the artifices of governmental control.101 His description of the
problem, however, has been more useful than his optimistic supposed
solution. Private profit-seeking mechanisms are so powerful, the re-
ceiving commons so diffuse and hard to monitor, and the brokerage
system required to maintain a trade in social costs so difficult to
conceive, that the old bipolar players of business and governmentt02
have been able to continue their business as usual. Social costs con-
tinue to be generated and accumulate in clouds of vastly troublesome
externalizations. Private corporate decisionmakers and public agency
officials still often operate as if in an insulated sphere, ignoring the
detritus and accumulated interacting consequences of their actions.
Rachel Carson showed us, however, that this tendency is dominated
by short-term individualized thinking and can be quite dysfunctional
in overall terms. Humans, corporations, and disparate segments ofthe
environment are not dissociated individual islands floating in a vac-
uum; they live in a web of direct and indirect interconnections. Ex-
and ability to spend budgets) and institutional momentum. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747, 754-55
(1982).
101 This requires heroic assumptions about measurability of consequences, as well as perfect
information, no transaction costs, no disparate access to markets, or disparate resources. See
Donald Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 610--16 (1992); see also Coase, supra note 10, at 15-16.
102 In Lon Fuller's terms, the bipolar system-regulators balancing regulated entities in the
economy-has always been too narrow a basis for rational societal governance. Instead govern-
mental rationality requires "multipolarity"-including government, industry, and a variety of
citizen outsiders who, uniquely in the American system, have been able to enter in and playa
gadfly role. See Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 1, at 995-98.
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ternaIized costs do not disappear, even if they are ignored.103 Externali-
ties go somewhere, and tend to have serious accumulated consequences
that can end up dwarfing the short-term actions that spawned them.
Then and now, however, humans and their marketplace do not volun-
tarily rush to take into account the negative effects of what they do,
so law is necessary arid inevitable.
Since Carson's Silent Spring picked up on Coase's identification of
social costs, it has become impossible to maintain the out-of-sight,
out-of-mind illusion that externalities can be ignored. Carson's work
has helped make it painfully obvious that we all must live together,
interconnected, in an essentially closed system. Pollution, risk, and
resource depletion are real social costs that have far-reaching conse-
quences that modern science has learned to track and measure, and
modern policy has been forced to address as a high utilitarian priority.
In effect, Rachel Carson spread a broad intellectual catch-basket
beneath the Coasian welfare economists' universe ofbenefit-maximiz-
ing individual actors, so as to collect and take overall account of
jettisoned "externalized" social costs, even if they are indirect and
unmarketized.104
Rachel Carson showed us how the powerful human tendency to
externalize can be harmful in overall terms and very hard to correct.
The marketplace resists rather than embraces the external-cost bro-
kering function that Coase thought could resolve the pollution prob-
lem. The same human nature that has produced the boisterous pro-
ductive energies of modern economies creates the dysfunctions that
threaten the whole, and powerfully resists integrative civic corrective
action or accounting.
Rachel Carson showed that predictable systemic problems follow
when official players make decisions in traditional terms, looking with
a narrowed field of vision at short-term benefits, one-shot technologi-
cal horizons: ''You got bugs? Well, then, go get a pesticide. Zap. Now
you've got what you wanted. Dead bugs. The end." As Carson taught,
however, that is not all that happens. There is no such thing as a
simple one-shot technology; everything has continuing long-term con-
sequences. Pesticides do not just kill target bugs, they kill many of
their ecological neighbors as well, eliminating the rich, stable equilib-
103 See CARSON, supra note 10, at 187-98.
1M There is no such word as "unmarketized," but it is a useful term for denoting consequences
which do not traditionally or conveniently have a monetary or political market value, but which
nevertheless have societal importance.
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rium that had naturally evolved in the land to give it its fertility in
the :first place.lo5 Pesticides do not just disappear after they have killed
the target bugs. They linger on and on, blowing in the wind, leaching
into groundwater, moving up through ecological food chains.
The lessons Carson drew from DDT pesticides, moreover, readily
applied themselves to many other settings as well-not only to other
kinds of pollution, but also to resource management issues like timber
and grazing, to highway and transportation planning, pharmaceuticals
and health technology, and by extension to many other areas of na-
tional policy.IOG Although humans may not take account of the real
social and ecological costs of their actions, nature keeps a comprehen-
sive tab and real consequences follow.I07 Not to heed the logic of the
Carson-Coase paradigm-allowing private and public enterprises to
act as if they are unconnected islands where out of sight is out of
mind-means that a society risks short and long-term shipwreck on
the shoals of its own detritus, not just an accumulation of toxics, but
also a host of other social costs and unintended consequences.lOS
From this perspective an important utilitarian precautionary prin-
ciple has asserted itself: unless you collectively are sure that the
negative consequences will be foreseeable, minor, and mitigatable, or
105 See CARSON, supra note 10, at 54-57, 61. It is remarkable in retrospect how books written
by three women at virtually the same historical moment so powerfully reshaped so much of
modern American society's view of life. See generally id.; BETl'Y FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE
MYSTIQUE (1963); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
106 Just as others, like John Muir, had foreshadowed Carson's ecological arguments, her logic
of comprehensive societal accounting was a familiar theme in the work of John Dewey and the
pragmatists, as well as an underlying premise of welfare economics.
Indeed, the Carson Paradigm is obvious, virtually a truism. Truism or not, however, it was
generally ignored as a functional societal policy. Carson's formulation, howeve1i instantly clicked
with a wide range of people who wanted to take action in the field that came to be known as
environmentalism, and had broad popular and political impact. Perhaps the environmental
problems she identified were more tangible, directly related to things people saw around them.
Perhaps her formulation made coherent critical analysis available to more people, and offered
more coherent prescriptive corrections. Perhaps it just came at the right time. And insofar as
the identification of the Carson Paradigm is itself a truism, it seems to be one that usefully
deserves more attention in ongoing analysis of environmental fact and policy.
Without casting the proposition so universally as to be meaningless, the crux of Carson's
logical reminder of the necessity of accounting comprehensively for consequences direct and
indirect, positive and negative, obviously holds logical significance for current debates about
industrial policy, immigration, welfare, indeed virtually all human decisionmaking.
107 When there is uncertainty about the scale of consequences, ecology also teaches the
precautionary principle that we should as little as possible disrupt the long-evolved diversity
and equilibrium we inherited.
lOS Or, in welfare economics terms, unaccounted externalized costs lead to society-,vide subop-
timal results.
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that the background foundational equilibria will not be disrupted, you
had better be sure that what somebody proposes to do is worth the
potential costs. It is safer not to casually risk the escalating domino
consequences that may follow.I°9 In this regard Carson showed that
moving from a human-centered master-of-nature perspective to the
holistic human-species-as-constituent-part-of-nature view is not just
an ethical idea-it is fundamentally practical and utilitarian as well.
Rachel Carson's concept also changed the scope and hierarchy of
the perceptual landscape we apply to human actions. Western socie-
ties traditionally have tended to view human actors as the central
players in the life of the planet, with nature as a subservient and
pliant backdrop.uo Carson showed, through the ecological realm, that
the backdrop to human activity may be far larger in scale and impor-
tance than the human figures pirouetting in the foreground. Nature
has developed a richly diverse, interacting, and evolving equilibrium111-
communities of communities around the planet providing services pre-
viously unrecognized, fulfilling important productive functions previously
taken for granted and capable of causing broadly destructive systemic
consequences when they are disrupted or destroyed.112
B. Environmental Law as the Embodiment of Public Values
Environmental law developed in order to take account of the social,
ecological, and economic values that were getting overlooked in the
109 The Precautionary Principle lately has achieved international recognition, emerging as a
major international policy norm. See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 12, at 59--60; U.N.
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, THE EARTH SUMMIT 119 (Stanley P.
Johnson, ed.1992) [hereinafter EARTH SUMMIT].
110 See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 12-13; cf 1 WINSTON CHURCHILL, HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES 140 (1956) (noting story of King Canute, who knew that
the ocean was more powerful than he).
111 It now generally is conceded that natural equilibria are dynamic, not static balances. There
is no ideal historical "natural balance" to which all communities can be returned, despite the
classical rhetoric of some environmentalists. See Fred B. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The
Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
847, 848 (1994).
112 A good homey example is Carson's discussion ofthe crucial role ofdiverse soil bacteria and
earthworms in creating and maintaining soil fertility. Once the soil is poisoned by pesticides
over vast areas, exterminating or drastically reducing these ecological chains, humans must try
to replicate the natural pest-control and nutrient-investment cycles. To do this artificially, it
turns out, is hugely expensive and not very successful. See CARSON, supra note 10, at 55--56,
107-08, 253-55.
Another vivid extension of Carson's bacteria and earthworm analysis is the human urge to
dam flowing water. The Aswan Dam and others like it are huge, dramatic edifices ultimately
dwarfed by their prosaic natural consequences: little snail-borne schistosomes killing and maim-
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calculus of the private corporate marketplace, because some exter-
nally imposed system of civic values had to be applied. It evolved a
remarkable range of issues and mechanisms, a biodiversity of ap-
proaches and responses developed to address the problems that soci-
ety discovered could no longer be ignored. And it did so primarily at
the insistence ofnon-official players-citizen activists and nongovern-
mental organizations who were helped along by a few significant
disasters vividly covered by the press.113 Public values are not auto-
matically espoused and integrated into laws by legislators or judges,
but require great counter-entropic efforts to inject them into the
political process and lawmaking. Environmental law has grown from
virtual insignificance in 1960 to a complex array of doctrines and
strategies designed and structured to cope with literally hundreds of
real problems identified as requiring serious social ordering, stretch-
ing from the backyard and the law of neighbors to global fisheries,
pollution, climate change, and beyond.H4
Consider environmentalism's amazing subject matter diversity. It
includes chemical wastes buried in suburban fields, seal puppies clubbed
to death on floating ice packs, uranium fuel rods shipped overseas to
nuclear power plants, toxic chemical threats to vulnerable neighbor-
hoods in Italy, India, and Georgia, issues of environmental justice for
low income neighborhoods and communities of color, the imminent
extinction of various endangered species, commercialization of na-
tional parks, porkbarrel dam-building, historical preservation, Third
World rainforests and desertification, rat bites and lead poisoning in
ing tens of thousands of valley residents; little grains of sediment, deposited by the trillions,
clogging reservoirs and blocking turbines, causing the washing away of thousands of acres of
downstream valley lands and coastline, and cutting off nutrient flows to maritime fishing
industries; and so on. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Multi-Lateral Lending Banks, Environmental
Diseconomies, and the International Lending Process: The Example ofThird World Dams, 9
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 169, 180--86 (1989) [hereinafter Plater, Third World Dams].
113 See the historical overview analysis ofthe role ofcitizens in accomplishing the development
of environmental law, in Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 1, at 989, 1005.
114 ''Beyond'' includes outer space. Much of the evolving law of outer space in fact sounds in
environmental law-issues of space junk in the geosynchronous orbit, normative constraints on
radioactive contamination of space, and the like, and even the question of whether a Georgia
entrepreneur should be allowed to launch a mile-wide Mylar billboard into earth orbit to be
visible like a commercial moon to billions of earthbound potential consumers. See generally
Daria Diaz, Trashing the Final Frontier: An Examination of Space Debris from a Legal
Perspective, 6 TaL. ENVTL. L.J. 369 (1993); see also Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties ofStates in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, 18 U.S.T 2410, Oct. 10, 1967; John Kroll, Company Markets Orbital Advertising Space,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 13, 1993, at 1c, noted in PLATER ET AL" NLS, supra note
18, at 41 (Teacher's Manual Update (1994».
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urban slums, chlorofluorocarbons thinning stratospheric ozone, global
warming, and hundreds more.115
And consider the function of the dozens of environmental statutes
and doctrines that arose in the United States and became part of the
accepted legal process. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress passed the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,116 the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1969,117 the Clean Air Act of 1970,118 the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act,119 the Noise Control Act,120 the Clean Water
Act,l21 the Coastal Zone Management Act122 in 1972, and more than
two dozen more.l23 In the years that have followed, the scope and
number of environmental statutes have continued to grow.
These modern statutory systems wittingly or unwittingly reflected
Rachel Carson's teachings. They addressed ecological and economic
values and problems that had not been acknowledged or had been
inadequately accounted for, and targeted public as well as private
enterprises.124 In each case these statutes imposed new publicly ori-
ented substantive or procedural requirements upon actors who oth-
115 See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 2-3.
116 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1994).
117 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1994).
118 33 U.S.C. §§ 7521-7671q (1994).
119 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-61c (1994).
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18 (1994).
121 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
122 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1994).
123 By my count there were 34 important environmental statutes passed in the three years
after NEPA. See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 358-60 (Teachers Manual (1992)
(historical statutory appendix». Only Jimmy Carter's years come close, with 20 in an equivalent
span, many of which were perfecting amendments. [d. at 360-62.
12I The market force pressures that necessitate environmental law are not driven exclusively
by private actors. Often a combination of public and private power lie behind environmental
problems-as with nuclear waste exports, porkbarrel water projects, subsidized resource de-
pletions, and the like.
The putative bi-polar structure of societal governance, with official governmental watchdogs
guarding against market excesses, in practice has often evolved into a uni-polar laissez-faire
love-nest, as the marketplace coopted the guardians. "Iron Triangles" are formed by a regulated
industry, its regulators in the bureaucracy, and the local congressional delegation, and they
become a powerful status quo, each sector of the triangle enjoying its own intricate system of
rewards.
The term "Iron Triangle" appears to have been used originally by Professor Bruce Hammon
at the University of Illinois and the Coalition for American Rivers in the late 1960s in efforts
to resist the water resources porkbarrel. The term has useful descriptive application in a wide
variety of agency-industry settings. See FRED POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND
FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE 286--89 (1982). Somewhat confus-
ingly, of course, under the rubric being used here, the ''hi-polar'' paradigm often leads to Iron
Triangles. Go figure.
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erwise would have made their operative decisions in dysfunctionally
narrow terms.
NEPA is a prime example. NEPA, whether or not Congress under-
stood what it was doing when it passed the bill, reflected both the
critically important common sense decisional principle that, like indi-
viduals, government agencies should consider all relevant options and
consequences before they act, and the reality that they were not
doing SO.I25
The pollution statutes created comprehensive federal standards
and a comprehensive process for monitoring and enforcing corporate
compliance with those standards-perhaps the most wideranging,
voluminous, intricately intensive regulation of human enterprise in
our history.126 Pollution statutes are the classic examples ofregulatory
requirements that hold externalizing enterprises accountable for the
social costs they impose. The newer generation of governmental mar-
ket-incentive systems for achieving environmental compliance are no
less an imposition ofpublic values; only the means by which the values
are imposed upon market forces are different.127 Planning statutes
attempt to require rational overall programming to guide public and,
to a much lesser extent, private decisionmaking. Other statutes focus-
ing on wildlife and endangered species, workplace health, and particu-
lar zones ofenvironmental disruption like coastal areas, similarly have
attempted to acknowledge systematic problems that previously had
not been viewed systematically.128
125 It is likely that Congress did not lmow what it was doing, but that does not change the
importance of its implicit strategy, which has subsequently been copied far and wide as a basic
construct of rational decisionmaking. PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 600.
126 The Internal Revenue Code and regulations, for instance, have less intensive day-to-day
application to industrial production activity, and are lesser in bulk than the statutory and
regulatory provisions of the Clean Air Act, CWA, and Resource Conservation Recovery Act
(RCRA).
127 The best recent example of market-incentive statutes may be the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments setting up tradeable pollution credits to encourage efficiency and rewards for
polluting industries that clean up their emissions. Without a coercive backdrop, howevel; most
such market-incentive systeIns would not function. Compare the quite different approaches
represented by subsidy programs, where governments pay polluters to stop polluting, with the
swampbuster provisions of the CWA where farmers get economic supports if they do not
undercut wetlands protections, and with so-called "free market environmentalism" which urges
reliance upon voluntary environmental conservation actions by market entities. See genemlly
TERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
128 International environmental law picked up the American lead and subsequently has gath-
ered momentum in promulgating a seIies of conventions. See, e.g., United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, openedferr signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.621122, 21 I.L.M.
1261; Convention on International Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mm~
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Thus, the learning from Carson and Coase was put into effect
through evolving environmental laws. In a vast array of settings,
environmental law reasserted civic values and attempted to rein in
the ultimately harmful tendency to cast off and ignore environmental
effects.
IV. RESISTANCE TO IMPLEMENTING WHAT WE KNow: THE
FOURTH HORSEMAN AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
We have learned a great deal over the past several decades. The
breadth and depth of our scientific knowledge about population, re-
source use, and pollution, the three major human impacts on the
planet, have increased exponentially. Environmental science has greatly
increased its sophistication in understanding, explaining, and predict-
ing the complex interacting cause-and-effect relationships within the
myriad elements of our ecophysical context. Of course, the more we
know, the more we do not know. But the growth in scientific knowl-
edge means that we will never be able to go back to the ignorance of
the 1960s-when we were able to deny or ignore the consequences of
our actions on the environment.
But the Fourth Horseman relentlessly harries and pursues the
expanding science, policy, ethics, and law of our environmental knowl-
edge: the Gap between what we know and what we are able to do
continues to plague us and our planet.
Sometimes the problem is that the relevant actors have insufficient
knowledge.l29 But what about those problem situations where we do
know enough about cause-and-effect to know how actions and behav-
3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243; International Convention For the Regulation of
Whaling, Dec. 2,1946,10 U.S.T. 952, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development: Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All 'IYPes of Forests, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.15116/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M. 881. International environmental law also has led to the evolu-
tion and adoption of principles of accounting for environmental social costs like the ''Polluter
Pays" principle in bilateral and multilateral accords, regional structures like the European
Community, international forums like the Brundtland Commission, and the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development at Rio. See, e.g., EARTH SUMMIT, supra note 109,
at 120.
129 For example, in the Third World, one encounters difficulty in explaining that deforestation,
downhill plowing, or field-burning-all of which are traditional practices-have severe conse-
quences in erosion and subsequent infertility. In other settings, of course, information can be
highly ambiguous or uncertain, which prevents its implementation, especially where delay
generates individual profits.
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ior should be changed? It still can be immensely difficult to apply what
we know.
Consider what we know about the ozone layer, global warming, the
expansion of human populations beyond regional carrying capacity,
overgrazing, the crash of fisheries, multifarious kinds of pollution, and
on and on. We often know what causes problems-problems that must
be halted or ameliorated to sustain our future-but are nevertheless
unable to respond adequately. Why? The Fourth Horseman is driven
by the fundamental cost-externalizing logic of human nature where
the collective civic rationality of accounting for public costs is contra-
dicted and resisted by the rationality of an individual entity's cost-
benefit calculus.
Sometimes the Gap between what we know and what we do is not
a direct manifestation of market forces. We can understand the fact
and the dynamics of drastic population growth curves, and the need
to limit numbers in order to provide meaningful lives for future gen-
erations.l3o Effectively addressing this need for limits, however, is
frustrated by a process involving millions of individual human deci-
sions.l3l The difficulty in managing population dynamics lies within
hormones and the highly individualized realm of procreative behavior.l32
For resource depletion and pollution, however, it is largely market
forces, both practical and political, that appear to drive the Fourth
Horseman. As to resources, we can understand the devastating sta-
tistical curves of modern natural resource consumption and despolia-
tion-worldwide crashes in fisheries stocks, loss of forests to unsus-
tainable logging and agriculture, destructive and wasteful mining
and hydrocarbon exploitation, and loss of arable lands and drinkable
water-and yet find little or no practical mechanism for enforcing
sustainable development.l33 As to pollution, the complex, intercon-
130 Limiting our numbers is necessary because neither agriculture nor industrial production
any longer requires the labor of more than 10% of the population.
131 UNCED, the 1992 Rio Conference, demonstrated an inability to mention population prob-
lems. Moreover, there are even debates about whether there really is a population problem. See
generally JOEL E. COHEN, How MANY PEOPLE CAN THE EARTH SUPPORT? (1995). The current
realization of the importance of finding sufficient quality jobs for our populations, and the
realization that the sense of meaning in human lives comes from what individuals do, compel
considerations beyond the minimum-necessary-caloric-intake terms of the "carrying capacity"
debates.
132 Economics, however, can play a significant driving role in reproductive decisions on the
individual level, as Hardin discussed in his Tragedy of the Commons. See generally Gm'rett
Hardin, The Tradgedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
133 The fishery exmnple is classic. See Plater, First Principles, supra note 1, at 674-77.
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nected, and serious effects of releasing chemical and toxic compounds
into the environment are increasingly understood, but avoidable dis-
charges and exposures are substantially unregulated in this country
and abroad. In addition, effective pollution management, which would
allow sustainable quality of life and development, continues to escape
US.l34
Sometimes the problem is practical; the Gap between what we
lmow and what we can implement is caused by the physical imprac-
ticality of bringing a socially utilitarian mandate to bear. Consider
pursuing sustainability by fixing a limit on the number of a species of
fish that can be taken from a sector of the ocean by a farfiung multi-
national fleet-even if a legal quota is established, its enforcement is
extremely difficult in practical terms.I35 Similarly, preventing the de-
struction of rainforests or pollution from Third World agriculture and
industry is more than a matter of getting a law passed.
In other settings there is a powerful inclination toward denial-
where conscious recognition of externalized public harms, or aclmow-
ledgment of possible regulatory violations, would get in the way of
maximizing individual benefits.136 Denial, or "an internal veil of opera-
tional expediency," is for all of us, including corporations, a natural
tendency that can serve to set up resistance and avoidance of envi-
ronmental mandates-even for actors who are not Project Relief
promoters of the Contract with America.137
As to the industrialized world, however, and wherever corporate
actors are involved, the Gap between society's lmowledge of what
should be done and actual implementation is less often a question of
denial or of the practicalities of enforcement, than of politics and law:
will political power delay and obstruct the process of applying non-
134 For example, under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k, the nation's most comprehensive toxics
statute, the EPA is able to address only about 20% of the annual waste stream. John C.
Dernbach, Industrial Waste: Saving the Worst for Last?, 20 EnvtI. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,283 (July, 1990).
135 See generally John G. Sutinen et al., Measuring and Explaining Noncompliance in Fed-
erally Managed Fisheries, 21 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 335 (1990).
136 Because of human psychology, there also is often a denial of potential internal, private
harms. Some riverbank homeowners, enjoying the benefits of their usually beautiful location,
deny against reason, the tangible dangers of floods. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Floodlines and
the Police Power, 52 'lEx. L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1974) (and property values are set at the level
of the stupidest buyer in a market). Engineers build dams without considering dysfunctional
consequences to the dams, never mind their consequences to the surrounding communities. See
Plater, Third World Dams, supra note 112, at 169, 186--88.
137 See Plater, First Principles, supra note 1, at 668--69.
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profit-generating civil mandates to market enterprises? Tobacco of-
fers a vivid example ofwhy the answer is generally "yes." The tobacco
industry, acting through the Tobacco Institute, has successfully re-
sisted legal regulation, financial accountability, and even largely pre-
vented government from cutting off subsidies, for an addictive prod-
uct that imposes substantive net public harms.
The common sense of cost externalization, coupled with observed
reality, indicates that market players possess potent political forces
to block or diminish the imposition of public values, forces they natu-
rally employ. The resulting political power of the Fourth Horseman
is substantial. It is not easy to impose rational social constraints for
the good of a larger community upon human enterprises driven by
internalized profits. Consider the way one economic entity attempts
to resist cost internalization, then multiply this result by tens of
thousands of economic entities, and you have a vast concurrent resis-
tance permeating the governance process. A regulated entity natu-
rally looks to other similarly situated businesses to apply cooperative
pressure at local, state, and federal levels.I38 Fueled by market self-
interest and the tax deductibility of business expenses, market forces
have built intricately interconnecting and powerful networks of asso-
ciations, each with impressive public relations, research, and lobbying
budgets targeting the government process.
Like water flowing downhill, market forces, and the Coasian natural
laws that drive them, inherently resist any artificial barriers that
curtail their profit-maximizing externalizations of social costs. To place
a single sandbag into the current is difficult and not likely to have
significant effect. As other sandbags are added with great effort, the
natural forces still pour around them. When finally a working accu-
mulation of sandbags is secured, the waters may mostly turn to the
path of less resistance, but do not stop trying to infiltrate and under-
cut the obstacles blocking their maximum satisfaction. Across the
entire face of the environmental law dike, the pressures are felt.
Lobbyists, lawyers, media managers, and political action committees
apply insistent and comprehensive pressures to obtain specialized
subsidies and to suborn the public programs created for broader
138 See generally Oliver Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415 (1984). Thus, a paper
company concerned about water pollution regulation participates in various coalitions and
pressure groups at local, state, and federal levels, some made up of other paper companies,
others of water polluters generally, anti-regulation manufacturing associations, industry-spon-
sored "public interest law foundations," and think tanks.
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societal interests. Agencies are blunted or captured by the classic
double-pronged tactics of the marketplace-strident resistance and
seduction-and when citizens attempt to get around the phenomenon
of agency capture139 by going to the courts, the forces of the market-
place try to undercut citizen standing and judicial remedies.140
There has long existed an earnest institutional effort to resist and
turn back environmental protections, coming from those who are
forced to internalize costs previously passed wide to the commons.
Resistance from the old institutions has been a continuing and pow-
erful part of the evolution of environmental law. Rachel Carson was
subjected to vitriolic barrages from industry and pointed condescension
from government agencies. Environmental plaintiffs regularly were
139 On the classic political science phenomenon of "agency capture," see PLATER ET AL., NLS,
supra note 18, at 722, 764-66, 827-28.
Attorney General Richard Olney wrote to the president of a railroad in 1892 in response to
the latter's plea for abolition of the ICC:
[t]he Commission .•. is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the
popular clamor for government supervision of railroads, at the same time that the
supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to
be, the more inclined it will be found to take the railroad view ofthings. It thus becomes
a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people and a sort of
protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests.... The part
of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it.
Letter from Richard Olney to Charles Perkins (1892), in Louis Jaffe, The Effective Limits of
the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67lIARv. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.7 (1954).
140 In the field of statutory enforcement litigation, begimIing during the Nixon Court, there
have been ongoing efforts to cut back access of citizen enforcers to the federal courts, and to
circumscribe the terms of legislative enactments, reducing them to exercises in form rather
than substance. Citizens attempting to enforce federal laws can find themselves excluded from
standing by the terms of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, from a cause
of action by Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which seems to give corporate polluters
one free bite at the apple, and the recent decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
shielding state defendants, all of which makes citizen enforcement a less credible deterrent to
industrial decisions to pollute. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, No. 94-12, 1996 U.S.
LEXIS 2165, at *20 (Mar. 27, 1996); Lujan v. Defenders of WIldlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992);
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987).
Given the overall logic of many ifnot most environmental arguments that reach court, there
is no single coherent theory of defense except to prevent environmental arguments from being
considered on the merits. The ultimate compliment to environmentalism is that the focus of
antienvironmental initiatives is to cut off judicial review at the threshold-by relying on doc-
trines ofstanding, reviewability, exhaustion, and ripeness. In the legislatures, lobbyists for Iron
'Iiiangles periodically have been able to constrain the scope of citizen enforcement and prevent
extensions of the process. The decisions of the Nixon and Reagan justices often can be under-
stood through this perspective of resistance against civic accounting, cutting back on standing,
deferring to Iron Triangle agency decisions, overriding environmental statutes through exer-
cises of activist judicial discretion, cutting back on successful plaintiffs' ability to recover fees
for statutory enforcement efforts, and so on.
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branded agents of Moscow seeking the overthrow of America's indus-
trial economy.l4l
Before the arrival of the Contractarians, Project Relief, and their
allies, the visible front line of that effort was the so-called Wise Users.
They presented anecdotes of ordinary citizens-small time ranchers,
logging families, ''Mom and Pop" businesses-all hurt by "Kafkaesque"
regulations. The Wise Users called, however, not for targeted relief
for small operators, but for broad corporate deregulation. Who pro-
vided the impetus, money, and media access for the legislative as-
saults against environmental regulation? Like a number of the latter-
day "public interest law firms,"l42 the "populist" antiregulatory groups
turn out to be well-financed fronts for the industries whose externali-
ties induced regulation in the first place-those exploiting our public
lands in the grazing and timber industries, western water interests
who receive federally subsidized water from porkbarrel projects at
prices lower than available in Cleveland or Boston, and those rugged
individuals from the mining industry who are given their raw mate-
rials from the public domain, without royalties, on the payment of
trivial fees.143 As the corporate membership list of Project Relief
likewise illustrates, the power and momentum behind the assaults on
environmental regulation come from market players that are forced
by environmental law to internalize public values.
The recent anti-regulatory legislation, in other words, does not
reflect an agenda of good government and regulatory reform, but an
agenda for the elimination of environmental protections by denying
civil values.l44
141 See, e.g., Glen Martin, Ecologists Have No Use Far "Wise Use," S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 1992,
at C9; Michael Satchell, Any Colar But Green, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 21, 1991, at 74.
142 See Houck, supra note 138, at 1460 (noting how the Pacific Legal Foundation and its
progeny consistently operate as tax deductible fronts for antigovernmental industry positions).
143 For example, People for the West and its parent organization the Western States Public
Lands Coalition, are reported to receive 96% of their funding from corporate donors like
Kennecott Copper Co., Chevron, Hecla Mining, Pegasus Gold Corp., Crown Resources, Great
Western Chemical, Garber Land & Livestock, Pfizer, Inc., Montana Talc Co., Homestake Mining,
and more than 30 others.
144 Internationally, the same market force phenomenon resists international initiatives to
prevent pollution and protect forests and other global resources-and market resistance is
supplemented by tensions inherent in the concept of sovereignty. See, e.g., Hardin, supra note
132, at 1243 (providing reminders of the fractionaIizing tendency of sovereignty in international
management of global commons).
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LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
What lessons can be drawn from the civic role of environmental law
and the powerful resistance it engenders? No matter how much it is
resented by political-economic establishments, for the remaining his-
tory of the world, or at least as long as humans are around, the
environmental principle of identifying, anticipating, regulating, and
accounting for externalized social costs will continue to be an impor-
tant analytical construct. This modest assertion is supported by the
reality of its fundamental perception: things do have interacting short
and long-term consequences, and our different human initiatives and
enterprises do not exist in insulated unconnected boxes. Rational
societal decisionmaking must integrate an analysis of foreseeable in-
teracting consequences. There is no longer room in the planet's natu-
ral, social, and geophysical systems for broadscale externalization of
social costs in any decisional calculus. We cannot ignore or sacrificially
write off avoidable human mistakes that have serious systemic con-
sequences. It is this reality that provides environmental law with a
broad and legitimate foundation in the fundamental logic of societal
governance.145
Environmental law will continue as an important conduit for the
meaningful integration of practical social values into the structures of
national and international governance. It will also continue to be
resented and resisted by the market forces it constrains. So how can
the functional role of environmental law be conserved?
To balance the powerful tendencies toward resistance, environmen-
talism and environmental law must become and remain a part of our
civic education, never again relegated to the status of a passing fad.
Despite recent efforts by industrial interests to "roll back Ranger
Rick" by undermining the environmental education movement's work
145 In a recent essay, Professor Dan Tarlock, a pioneering environmental law teacher, some-
what dourly worried that environmental law lacks recognized legitimacy and legal depth,
particularly noting a lack of constitutional roots in the erratic regulatory megastructures of
pollution law. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Ncmequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling ofEnvironmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1994). Given environmen-
talism's extraordinary rediscovery ofpublic trust law, the complex development ofinternational
environmental law and custom, state constitutional provisions, as well as the potential effects
of the Fifth and Ninth Amendments, I think it incorrect to say that environmentalla:w lacks
such foundations. The common law, moreover, gives this field roots that go back deep into
medieval history.
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in building public awareness of environmental costs,146 the logic of
environmental analysis will continue to be compelling. Environmen-
talism may well be on its way to becoming the intellectual movement
of the transcentury era, integrating science, philosophy, law, politics,
psychology, literature, and the artS.147 Environmental science-the
process of learning ever more about the physical context in which we
exist and the consequences of our actions therein-will continue to
grow in its importance, rigor, and inclusive scope, and will become
part of the scientific canon for all educated people.
For attorneys, it is clear from the evolution of environmental law
over the past two decades, and from CUlTent turmoils, that environ-
mental law must be thoughtfully reviewed, refined, redesigned, and
renewed. There cannot be a return to environmental law as it existed
in 1980. We have learned much since then about what works and what
does not, what is important and what is not, what is worth the effort
and what is not.
As to market forces' efforts to undercut environmental law, they
will continue at various levels of the political process. Given the in-
herent political power of this resistance, the lessons of the 104th
Congress emphasize the importance of incisive public interest analy-
sis and press coverage in order to shape the debate.
Itwas distressing to watch the 104th Congress propose cataclysmic
changes to federal and state environmental laws, in a lobby-domi-
nated legislative process marked by very low levels of factfinding,
intellection, and debate. Nationallegislative leaders denied the facts
146 The history of the North American Association for Environmental Education (NAAEE),
the dominant organization of environmental education, has reflected the recent increasing
pressures from industries distressed by the teaching of environmental sensitivities in our
nation's schools. See Thomas Harvey Holt, Growing Up Green: Are Schools Turning Om'
Children into Eco-Activists?, REASON MAG., Oct. 1991, at 36. The NAAEE conferences now
are sponsored generously by the same industries that currently are attacking environmental
legislation in the l04th Congress. Many educators report great pressures being brought against
discussion of "controversial" or "partisan" issues like recycling, clearcutting, and the like, and
tend to adopt a defensive strategy of "laying low," avoiding public policy issues, and attempting
to achieve innocuousness. In Arizona, an industry strike force of the so-called Wise Users, with
a budget of hundreds of thousands of dollars, defeated an environmental education initiative,
Industry prepares large volnmes of glossy antienvironmental school materials, but has recently
been able to stigmatize the National Wildlife Federation's Ranger Rick magazine as inappro-
priately partisan. The effort to prevent the next generation from learning environmental civics
will continue. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Citizenship and Political Controversy:
The Challenge of Bringing Analysis of Public Policy Issues into Environmental Education,
Address at the Proceedings of the NAAEE Conference (1995).
147 See Jay Parini, The Greening ofthe Humanities, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 29, 1995, at 52.
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of environmental science so painfully gained over the past thirty
years-although this New Unlearning cannot make the earth flat by
political fiat. l48 The Contract's assault on environmental law revealed
a basic systemic vulnerability, a process opacity in the politics of
legislation. Market pressures upon the legislative process are most
effective when they can maintain low visibility. Ifthe press can isolate
and illuminate issues on their merits, the public civic merits will tend
to dominate debate. When initiatives are not made publicly visible,
however-because they appear as a blur like the 104th Congressl49-
decisions will tend not to be made on their public merits.
Of the anti-regulatory legislative provisions catalogued in this es-
say, which represent only a small portion of the total in the 104th
Congress, how many were examined with some particularity by the
national media prior to the key votes on the bills? With the possible
exception of the Timber Salvage rider, the answer is probably none.
Most of the story was barely touched upon by the media, and that is
deeply distressing.
We are entering into an intricate, complex, and significant area of
inquiry, in which simplistic stands and sound bite quips miss the
reality and fundamental importance of the contending issues. This is
nothing less than the basic question of Democracy and Justice-how
to balance the Individual and the Community, private and public
rights and duties.l50 It raises fundamental questions about what gov-
ernment is and should be-a compact for implementing civic public
148 Like prior counter-revolutions; the present onslaught cannot succeed in the long term,
because the utilitarian significance ofthe science and fact ofenvironmental protection ultimately
is inescapable. Given the potency ofmodern technologies, however, it is possible that by political
fiat the earth nevertheless can be dealt some damaging long-term blows, as the Timber Salvage
rider sadly is demonstrating.
149 One thoroughly disenchanted commentator noted:
[j]ust trying to get a count on all the sneaky anti-environmental stuff now floating
through Congress like fecal coliform bacteria is a major journalistic sewage project.
'lUcked away in liders here, amendments there, in little zits on the appropriations bill,
are so many measures to damage the environment that it amounts to one big stink.
Molley Ivins, The Environment Doesn't Respond to Political Spin, SEA'lTLE TIMES, Dec. 25,
1995, at B5j see also, Davis, supra note 26, at 18-20.
150 Human nature has two sides that are contending: an exploitative, individualistic side that
is reflected in our economic, marketplace life, and a civic, social stewardship side that is reflected
in our moral, ethical, and cooperative governance tendencies. Guess which one normally is
dominant, both within us as individuals and within the society that reflects us? Individual
perceptions of hunger, or of burgeoning appetite, tend to collapse the second, and magnify the
first, as most of the time we just look out for Number One. The anomaly of the 1960's can be
explained as fat years when hunger was less an issue, while the music, sex, and purple haze
diminished aggressive human appetites and built group social feelings.
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values or a brokerage house in the sky, marketizing costs and benefits
and paying in taxpayer dollars for the right to regulate private eco-
nomic behavior.
Engaged citizens must work with the press and the political process
to illuminate the factual merits of the issues and the public values at
stake in lobbying assaults on environmental law and other public
interest structures.151 In the longer run, our society needs an institu-
tionalized information forum to facilitate the ability of journalists,
policymakers, and government officials to cope in real time with the
mindnumbing complexity of modern science, law, and economics.162 It
could lift us above the current political tyranny of infotainment and
the race-to-the-bottom in political discourse.
Ultimately it comes down to democracy in an American population
that is often regarded by politicians, merchandisers, embattled public
interest lawyers, and itself as a ponderous lumpenmass of impression-
able, unthinking Homer Simpsons. The public values of environmental
analysis ultimately depend upon the counter-entropic thoughts and
efforts of those who feel committed to civic values as well as to their
own individual welfare. As Thomas Jefferson said, "I know of no safe
depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people them-
selves; and ifwe think them not enlightened enough to exercise their
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion."I63
161 A number of law professors have begun organizing an effort to raise the level of public
debate by preparing reliable technical analyses of the public merits of ongoing legislative
initiatives. The "La Paloma" initiative can be accessed at paloma@bc.edu.
162 That function should draw upon the amazing capacities presented to us by the Internet
and the Worldwide Web.
Such a forum would permit quick and accurate responses to Limbaughian assertions (like the
House majority leader's recent argument that chlorofluorocarbon regulations in the Montreal
Protocol were based on scientific fraud), operating as a high-level information service and truth
squad. By its very existence, such an information forum would raise the level of national debate.
Reporters always would know that there was a place to go for quick access to the merits, and
that ifthey did not go there, their competition would, making them look bad or superficial. Even
politicians might learn that their comments would face informed rejoinders, ridicule, or support,
depending on how well-founded they were on the merits.
163 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wtlliam Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in PLATEn ET
AL., NLS, supra note 18, at 655.
